Quote:
Originally Posted by David_Hayward
(Post 130982)
I realised that I had written on this in my PhD thesis, so reproduce an extract from it for you:
|
Quote:
In addition to the losses in vehicles, there was also a considerable amount of other equipment abandoned in France and Belgium that created a dramatic shortfall in the material required to pursue the war effort. Over a thousand field guns and all heavy guns had been abandoned; let alone the tractors to haul them. The Canadian position could have been much worse as after the German spearhead reached Abbeville on the Channel coast on 20th May. Three days later the 1st Canadian Division ‘began to figure in the tactical picture’, and G.O.C. 1st Canadian Division Major-General A.G.L. McNaughton went to France to examine the situation as the initial plan was to use a Brigade Group to reopen lines of communication with the armies in the north. On 24th May elements of the 1st Division actually embarked at Dover but with the ring closed and tightening on the armies falling back on Dunkirk, it was realised that the most urgent need was the defence of the mainland. Thus the troops disembarked and returned to Aldershot.
On 26th May the plan of sending a Canadian Brigade Group to Dunkirk was revived, in order to help the withdrawal, and a move order was issued but countermanded a few hours later. On the 27th the plan was revived again, evidently the consequence of an appeal from Lord Gort and on that date the evacuation started. The same day saw the 1st Division along with ancillary troops receiving orders to move out of the training camp at Aldershot into an assembly area in the Northampton region ready to carry out its assigned role of defence of the British Isles, the plan being put into effect on 2nd June. Of all the vehicles sent to the Continent, only 4,739 returned to England. The great majority of these had not been unloaded as they belonged to both the 52nd Division and 1st Canadian Division with a few saved by the 154th Brigade and the remainder represented those that had been loaded before the panic orders were received at the ports.
However on 30th May, Churchill cabled Lord Gort, the B.E.F. commander with a note to be passed to the French that the U.K. would ‘build up a new B.E.F.’ with equipment for five divisions to include Canadian and Australian troops. By this time McNaughton had decided that the idea was foolish, and had resolved, if ordered to undertake the operation, to send as few troops as possible to make this ‘rather theatrical sacrifice’. On 5th June the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade Group was warned for a move back to Aldershot the following day; the remainder of 1st Division was to follow on 7th June. These movements were the result of the contemplated move to France. On 7th June it had been decided that the Division would go to France in four convoys, sailing on 11th, 13th, 15th and 17th June; the balance of the non-divisional troops would follow in another convoy on 18th June. The Canadians were to form part of a Corps being created under the command of Lt.-Gen. Brooke the other divisions being the 51st, already in France, and the 52nd, ‘now en route’. McNaughton never got beyond Plymouth. He had been informed that his Division would be concentrated in the close vicinity of Brest before moving up-country; and the first intimation he received that this plan had been changed was on 14th June. From 17th June the Canadians began to be evacuated from Brest, minus a considerable amount of supplies and vehicles which were destroyed. They arrived in Southampton by the 18th, and then entrained for Aldershot. The destruction of the Canadian transport before re-embarkation was a source of great dissatisfaction to the Canadian troops and their commander. McNaughton made no particular secret of his dissatisfaction with the manner in which his troops were treated on this occasion. At a divisional conference on 20th June, McNaughton mentioned his dissatisfaction with the late events, but added that this incident was now over: the new task was resistance to an invasion ‘which may be attempted within the next few days’, and with a view to this function the Canadian Force was now in G.H.Q. Reserve, ‘a hard-hitting mobile force ready to proceed North, South, East or West’. However the delays in assembling and then delivering the vehicles gave rise to concerns and took time to make up. Their losses prejudiced the C.M.H.Q. planning for provision for the 2nd Division. The 1st Infantry Brigade Group which actually arrived in France, lost most of their M.T. and other equipment through destruction under orders before withdrawal. The consequence was that when the Canadian Force moved to the Oxford area late in June, the units which had reached France were obliged to remain at Aldershot for re-equipment, and the force was thus one brigade group short. During the week ending 20th July, 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade and 1st Canadian Field Company moved to the Redhill area and returned to the order of battle. However 1st Canadian Field Regiment, 4the Canadian Ambulance and 1st Canadian Medium Regiment were still not included in the field force, the deficiencies now being mainly in M.T. In the course of the next few weeks the worst gaps were filled, and the 1st Canadian Division and the ancillary troops (now incorporated in 7 Corps) were in essentials prepared for battle. By then the 2nd Canadian Division were being landed.
We now know that the first Canadian forces’ deliveries of Southampton-assembled trucks was of eight 15-cwt. Trucks, noted in an official Report dated the week ending 18th May 1940 and the succeeding week’s report noted that 344 15-cwt. Trucks had been delivered to date. The major significance of this information is set out below. It is also now known that the first issues of Southampton-assembled trucks to Canadian units were made in early June 1940, including those sent to and destroyed in France [at least 50]. Detailed study of photographs suggests that issues were from the 174 C.K.D. Ford F.15 deliveries and deducting these from the 344 supplied suggests that the total included the 174 Chevrolet C.15 C.K.D. trucks . Because saving vehicles was less important than saving men, the 1st Canadian Division lost 216 of their new Canadian vehicles, including the Carriers of the 48th Highlanders of Canada Regiment . All Canadian guns were saved. There was ample time to save every vehicle but an element of pure panic allegedly gripped the officials at all the French ports. At Brest, the evacuation was carried out in such an atmosphere of needless desperation there was failure to utilize the full cargo space available . The irony is that more poignant when the Canadians landed back in Southampton less a substantial quantity of vehicles that had only recently been assembled at the C.M.D. and supplied to the C.S.A.F.
It is therefore understandable that after the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade Group was sent to France and then recovered minus their brand new trucks and Carriers ‘that feelings ran high. They had had a collection of unsuitable vehicles, and then when brand new Canadian military style vehicles arrived, they were used for a short time and then abandoned.
From the point of view of the Supply Column, one of the tragedies of the operation was the loss of the new vehicles which had been issued to them from the Mechanical Transport Vehicle Reception Depot at Bordon, Hants, on 8th June as they were leaving for Plymouth to embark for France .
It seems that the R.C.A.S.C. Mechanical Transport Depot at Bordon, Hampshire had ‘worked steadily for two days and two nights’. At the end of that time, the depot had issued all the vehicles required by the Brigade and, in addition, had withdrawn all the British transport it possessed and had arranged to have it transported back to the R.A.O.C. depot at Chilwell, Notts. , ready to be issued it would seem, to British forces. To compound this, there is evidence from captured German Umbauwagen that some if not all of these 15-cwt. Trucks abandoned in France were recovered by then Wehrmacht and then converted for their own use although it has to be said that some may have been ‘acquired’ in North Africa. Any that were not re-built would have provided spare parts for those that could be.
|
Very interesting, thank you. A balls-up in other words. "the officials at all the French ports" presumably means the British embarkation staffs and officers? The same sort of thing happened in Greece in 1941 I read recently: the ANZAC Division being ordered to leave their entrenching tools behind so that they arrived in Crete with no digging tools, and of course, not much of anything else equipment wise. I have seen German photos of guns abandoned in France in 1940 still in limber with sights and breechblocks in place. No attempt at disablement at all. |
