Tony,
You raise some important questions which are difficult to answer. I think some possible lines of investigation are the following.
1. What was Monty's thinking on the subject of 'I' tanks in general and the Churchill in particular before he left the UK for Egypt? Did he become converted to the idea of a universal tank upon witnessing the effectiveness of the Sherman at El Alamein or was he already biased against the Churchill? As I recall the British Army was considering relegating the Churchill to second-line status with the Covenanter until operations in Tunisia proved its value.
2. In the years leading up to WW2 Canadian doctrine tended to follow in the wake of British doctrine. Once the British adopted the 'I' tank concept, the Canadians followed suit. However, I wonder what certain senior officers, particularly Worthington, thought of the concept. As I understand it, Worthington played a major role in the design of the Ram, and I wonder if it represented his preference for the earlier light-medium-heavy tank concept vs. the light-cruiser-infantry tank concept. Certainly the Americans were wedded to the medium tank as the main weapon in their armored units.
3. What was Worthington's relationship with McNaughton?
4. Didn't Churchills support Canadian operations to clear the Channel ports?
5. I imagine the use of Canadian armored units in Sicily and Italy was predicated on the least possible disruption to the supply chain. Although Rams were very similar to Shermans, they weren't identical, and this could have caused problems with the supplying spare parts, replacement tanks, etc. Still, I agree with you that the main emphasis for British and Commonwealth armored units in the Italian campaign seemed to be (a) only using tanks with a 75mm dual purpose gun and (b) sticking with American equipment as much as possible (hence the late appearence of the Firefly and Archer, along with the complete absence of the Cromwell).
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