On the following day (October 28th) we had high hopes of entering TILBURG. But it was not to be. On the other side of the salient, in a sector held by the 7th US ARMOURED DIVISION, the Germans launched a counter-attack across the CANAL DE DEURNE, captured MEIJEL (7006) and were pressing on through the PEEL towards SECOND ARMY HQ in HELMOND. We were therefor warned to be ready to move East early the next morning. In the course of the day however reports became graver and by four o’clock we had already started off. We passed through EINDHOVEN and GELDROP, ‘A’ Echelon was dropped off at ZOMEREN (5911) and the tanks eventually arrived just West of ASTEN at 1.30 in the morning.
On the 29th - a day full of extraordinary rumours concerning the progress and success of the German thrust - the three tank squadrons moved out to support units of 227 BRIGADE in covering the approaches to ASTEN from the South-East. Two PANZER DIVISIONS - the 9th and the 15th - were said to be involved in the attack, but American reports, though sensational, were vague, and in fact no enemy were seen during the day. SECOND ARMY HQ however began to evacuate HELMOND.
Next day the Americans were withdrawn and 227 BRIGADE with the Battalion in support took over their positions - ‘S’ Squadron, with the ARGYLLs, in the village of HEUSDEN and Right Flank, with the HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY, and Left Flank, with the GORDONs, forward of the village to the right and left respectively. The Right Flank troops of Lieutenant FLETCHER and Lieutenant RUNCIE took up a position in a wood nearly a mile ahead of their Squadron during the night. At dawn grey figures were seen close to the tanks moving towards the enemy lines. It was assumed that these were our own infantry deploying forward of the wood. Half an hour later however it became clear that what had in fact been seen was a German Company who had spent the night in the wood. The remainder of the 15th SCOTTISH DIVISION and 6th GUARDS TANK BRIGADE were meanwhile concentrating behind. Shelling and mortaring were fairly heavy but the expected attack did not materialise and Lieutenant CAMERON’s troop of Left Flank was able to carry out an attack with a Company of the GORDONs on an occupied farm from which they brought back 23 prisoners. During the night the enemy regained possession of the wood from which Right Flank’s harbour area had to be repelled at dawn.
After two days of comparative quiet, the Reconnaissance Troop, on the 2nd November, brought in the first detailed information about the enemy to the East and South-East. Among other positions, an enemy company had been located in the peat bogs and an attack was quickly improvised by a company of the ARGYLLs supported by Lieutenant HICKLING’s troop from ‘S’ Squadron. Soon after the start of this the Infantry came under heavy and accurate mortar fire while the ground was practically impossible for tanks and two of these became bogged. Smoke laid to cover the work of extrication was mistaken by the Infantry for the pre-arranged signal to withdraw and the tanks, left unsupported in the gathering dusk, were attacked by enemy infantry. According to one of the other side, who passed through our hands six months later in SCHLESWIG, the troop killed about 130 men in a very few minutes; but in the action one of the bogged tanks had to be abandoned until next day when it was recovered intact. From the same prisoner we learnt that an SP gun that had opened fire with HE was unable to attack the tanks with AP shot since it had none left. The remaining two tanks of the troop eventually withdrew, after blowing up an enemy ammunition dump in the peat hags. The enemy, as it proved later, also withdrew.
On the 4th November shelling was much diminished and it became apparent that the enemy were falling back to the Canal. MEIJEL was retaken on 5th November by 44th (L) BRIGADE, supported in most difficult conditions by the GRENADIERS. On the 5th November we were able to move back to HELMOND (now vacated by SECOND ARMY HQ) and there we remained until the 20th November.
The enemy’s thrust had thus been driven back to where it started: but it still remained to clear him out of the wide stretch of country West of the MAAS. Plans were now made therefore for an operation beyond the DEURNE CANAL. This was to open with a clearing movement South of the CANAL DU NORD by 51st (H) DIVISION and 49th (WR) DIVISION and to develop into a general sweep of the area between the PEEL and the MAAS from South to North so as to link up with the 3rd (Br) DIVISION and the COLDSTREAM near VENRAIJ. As it turned out our part was to be an advance in a North-Easterly direction from the Canal-crossing near MEIJEL to TIENRAIJ and the banks of the MAAS beyond - a distance of some 20 miles. During the week occupied by this advance rain fell continuously for four days and intermittently thereafter. The previous ten days had also been wet or showery. In consequence the ground, naturally flat and low-lying, quickly became a morass and the track which formed the axis of the attack, and for six days constituted our only link with ‘A’ Echelon, was eventually all but impassable.
On the night of 18th November Captain GRAHAM and Captain BANKES accompanied patrols of the HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY to reconnoitre the ground between MEIJEL and the CANAL DE DEURNE. They found the going suitable for tanks and detected some slight enemy activity on the near side of the canal. On the 19th, Captain PEMBER, whose Reconnaissance Troop had for a couple of days been clearing minefields in the MEIJEL area, was unfortunately blown up on a mine and both he and his driver, Piper TAYLOR, were injured.
At seven o’clock in the morning of the 20th November we left HELMOND, passed through MEIJEL, crossed the DEURNE CANAL and formed up North of the VENLO road close to the village of BERINGE where we were sharply shelled by an SP gun. We had under command a squadron of FLAILs (C/Sqn, W Dgns), a batter of SP guns (146th Anti-Tank BATTERY) and a troop of AVsRE, including a bridge. We also had a couple of CHURCHILL bridge-layers. The FLAILS and SPs we shared out - a troop to each squadron. From BERINGE a track leads North-East to the village of SEVENUM (818140). This track was to be the axis of our advance. At 11.15 a.m. Left Flank and the GORDONs moved off. Within a mile they came under heavy mortar and Spandau fire from some houses just ahead and from the surrounding woods. This stopped the Infantry; but the tanks advanced amongst the houses, destroyed them by gun-fire and silenced the Spandaus. The “bag” destroyed them by gun-fire and silenced the Spandaus. The “bag” consisted of about 20 killed and 46 prisoners. After the attack however SP guns, first on the right and then on the left flank, opened fire from thick cover and, before being forced to withdraw, knocked out the tank of Lieutenant J. WILSON, killing him and wounding two of his crew. Two other CHURCHILLs were hit through not damaged and Lieutenant I.L. THORPE was severely wounded by small-arms fire. Left Flank then withdrew, after dark, to a Forward Rally on the left of the track while ‘S’ and the ARGYLLs harboured in the wood on its right. Right Flank, in the course of the afternoon, sent two troops off in a North-Westerly direction to support 44th (L) BRIGADE. They were soon sent back however. No contact was made with the enemy but one tank was lost on a mine and the driver, Guardsman GRIEVE, killed. As for the Reconnaissance Troop, they sent numerous patrols to the wooded area ahead. On one of these sorties Lance-Serjeant FENTON’s tank broke a track and he and the crew were captured. (See
http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/407568-post80.html)
At first light on the 21st November Left Flank and the GORDONs moved off again and reached a Canal nearly two miles beyond the scene of their fight on the previous day. No opposition was encountered. The bridge over the Canal however was blown and a CHURCHILL bridge and an AVRE bridge had to be laid to enable the tanks and infantry to cross. On the far side a bridgehead was formed which came under fairly heavy fire from guns, mortars and nebelwerfers. A patrol of Reconnaissance Troop meanwhile went to explore the village of VORST (819123): Lance-Serjeant BROWN’s tank was lost on a mine and the driver, Guardsman SHIELLS, was killed; but the other tank successfully completed its mission.
Rain had been falling heavily now for two days and nights and the ground was rapidly becoming a swamp. The approaches to the crossing were so bad that it was decided not to pass anyone else over that night and just before dawn the bridges themselves were shifted a few yards.
account of a Soldier