Quote:
Originally posted by Geoff Winnington-Ball
Sean, the two most significant elements of the Dieppe raid are the following, both falling under Mountbatten's purvue as the chief of Combined Operations.
The original operation was designated RUTTER and scheduled for early July. The plan incorporated heavy air and sea bombardment in support, this being deemed critical to success. The troops trained for it, were briefed for it, and were actually aboard ship when the raid was cancelled due to foul weather in the Channel. The soldiers were then released to their normal encampments/duties, RUTTER forgotten as just one more op the staff wallahs couldn't make happen.
|
I wouldn't disagree with Geoff's appraisal but I think it goes further and gets worse.
Quote:
|
Interestingly, although some postwar research has unearthed unconfirmed reports that the Germans were "expecting us", that has never been established beyond the shadow of a doubt, although it's not beyond one's imagination to suggest it true as the original mantle of secrecy had been wiped away.
|
Drawing on the work by Colonel John Hughes-Watson who was in the British Army Intelligence Corps from 1963 to 1993, the original cancellation of RUTTER was largely because of warnings and indications from ULTRA that the Germans did indeed expect an attack and had recognised Dieppe as a strong possibility as a target.
Quote:
|
Regardless, JUBILEE was RUTTER, with very little modification, and therein lies the second point: the few mods to the original plan were those you mentioned. First, the First Sea Lord declined to send his big ships into the Channel, for two reasons.
|
In fact Hughes-Watson describes the situation as squarely a Mountbatten go-it-alone having been piqued that RUTTER was cancelled. Originally Churchill asked Mountbatten to mount a morale-booster and to utilise the Canadian forces cooped-up in SE England and causing mayhem in an attempt to relieve the boredom.
Mountbatten used this as if it were personal authorisation of the highest level and quoted this "authority" whenever meeting an obstacle, however, in some areas of high command he couldn't push his luck and just did without. Officers who mentioned the Joint Chiefs of Staff were deflected by this so-called authority to keep it from them and certain written cancellation in writing.
Had the JCS been involved and tasked with the operation then the full panoply of arms would have been available with the Navy and RAF; plus intelligence from covert beach survey by frogmen, RAF PR input and ULTRA.
Quote:
|
The raid as designed should have been cancelled there and then, but no.
|
As it would have been if Mountbatten hadn't kept playing the Churchill authority card.
Quote:
|
The rationale went that as this was just a raid, not an invasion, they wished to minimize French civilian damage and casualties.
|
A good excuse and covering of the whole Mountbatten deception.
Quote:
|
Some say it was Churchill himself who insisted on JUBILEE, as a way of showing the Russians we were actually doing something to harass the Germans in the west.
|
Post fiasco cover-up.
Quote:
|
Others believe, as I do, that Mountbatten simply wanted to make a name for himself, to impress the higher-ups that he was accomplishing great things in Combined Ops.
|
Much nearer the truth.
Quote:
|
To be fair to all, the Canucks have to take a proportion of the blame themselves. McNaughton approved the operation in principle . . . . . . .
|
Largely these people were either hoodwinked by Mountbatten's deception and/or overawed by his position and royal connection.
Quote:
|
It has often been said that what the Allies learned from Dieppe was what guaranteed success at Normandy almost two years later. Nonsense.
|
More like Bollocks (capital B and two L's).
Quote:
|
That was a statement designed to deflect responsibility.
|
Everything from the official mouth was a cover-up and spin as we would say today. The smugly arrogant Mountbatten (formerly Battenburg but changed as that was too German) was virtually unimpeachable because of his connections although strong rumours abound that one officer did put him on his back in the mess after the "internal" truth came out.
Interestingly after Dieppe Churchill noted, and is a matter of the record:
"Although for many reasons everyone was concerned to make this business look as good as possible, the time has now come when I must be informed more precisely about the military plans."
In a deluge of questions that reveals just what Churchill didn't know about in '42 he continues,
"Who made them? Who approved them? What was Gen Montgomery's part in them? And Gen MacNaughton's part? What is the opinion about the Canadian generals selected by Gen MacNaughton? Did the General Staff check the plan? At what point was VCIGS informed in the Chief of the Imperial General Staff's absence?" (this latter pointing to the fact that Churchill knew that Gen Nye knew nothing about JUBILEE)
(See "Military Intelligence Blunders" ISBN 1 - 84119 - 067 - 5)
R.