[Mark W. Tonner]

Hi Norm/Art;

Reference: "Prior to Dieppe 50 members of the Carelton and York Regiment accompanied 4 Commando on a raid" - Part # 3:

Copy of memorandum of interview of Lieut. Ensor with Mr. Saunders, Combined Operations Recorder.

Operation "ABERCROMBIE"

Personal Account of Lieutenant J.P. Ensor - Carleton & York Regt.

8 Officers and 44 other ranks took part in the expedition. We started out on Tuesday night, 24th April, all of us being on board one M.G.B. with two A.L.C.'s in tow. We were to land on the South or White beach. I was in command of the party. There was no incident of any kind until we got to point X. We were all in very high spirits.

We were transhipped from the M.G.B. to the A.L.C. We were then about 2 miles off shore. Another M.G.B. was towing an S.L.C. and we lost a lot of time trying to find it. We had to use a mega-phone. In all I suppose we wasted about 15 minutes. This was partly due to bad visibility because the S.L.C. was being towed behind another M.G.B. and this was hard to find in the darkness. On reaching Point X, it had stopped its engines and we therefore had drifted. Those in the S.L.C. were responsible for the direction and navigation of the A.L.C.s. On board the S.L.C. was a Naval Officer, a Military Officer whose duty it was to advise us if fire support should be given, and a number of signallers.

When the party moved towards shore, one A.L.C. was to Port to other to Starboard. I was in the Port A.L.C. with Headquarters and the beach head party. The Starboard A.L.C. contained my two patrols. My intention was to land on White beach, make a reconnaissance of the defences, capture some prisoners and destroy a warehouse S.W. of HARDELOT. We had noticed from the photographs that a pill-box was on the roof and we therefore know that the enemy was in occupation of the warehouse.

When the three Assault craft, the two A.L.C.s and the S.L.C., got under way, the S.L.C. was moving on a bearing of I think S69E. As far as I could make out they were using a prismatic oil compass. So were we. We couldn't see the figures on the dial and the Military Officer started checking them and found we a few degrees out. I do not think that the boat compass on the A.L.C.s were working properly. Not long after getting under way fire was opened about 0210 hrs. I noticed tracers coming from the sea behind us a mile or so away. At that moment my A.L.C. became separated from the other A.L.C. and from the S.L.C. The boats then began to travel in a circle. Fire opened from the shore I should judge a single machine gun and then three searchlights were turned on. They were not strong and I don't think they picked us up although their beams struck us.

One A.L.C. to Port and one to Starboard and the S.L.C. ahead. I ordered the Bren gunners to mount their guns on the gunwales. There were two mounting in the bow. By then we were alone. All the men stood up although unprotected because they were eager to have a crack at the huns.

After we had been going for a short time an "E" boat I think it was passed close to our stern about 150 yards away. It was firing tracer but not at us. The Naval Officer with me, Sub. Lt. Jeffrey I think his name was, (The Sub. Lt. on board the other A.L.C. was named Sub. Lt. Sharp) had not practiced the operation with me when we had been training for it. In training I had been working with Lt. Quick.

I begun a consultation with Sub. Lt. Jeffrey. By now as I have said we were alone and though I had my beach head party with me I had lost touch with the A.L.C. containing my two patrols. We agreed that we must first find the other A.L.C. and them a landing. By that time I am sure we were not going towards the right beach. We were by then 3/400 yds. from the shore. We tried to find the other A.L.C. and cruised about but presently we began to get worried about the amount of petrol we had on board. We had, of course, to keep enough to take us back to England. Then we saw a rocket fired from on shore, the lights being Green over Red. It was right ahead of us and it was the signal that the operation was washed out. Immediately on seeing the rocket we turned about and set craft for England sailing on a bearing of 280o. Once again we had trouble with the prismatic oil compass. The Naval Officer took a bearing but could not see the figures on the dials very clearly. I used my own compass. We sent straight for England because we didn't want to use any more petrol looking for the M.G.B.s. I kept checking the bearing from time to time. At daylight we mounted the Bren guns as a protection against aircraft. Nothing was seen however and we were eventually picked up about 7 miles off Dungeness at approximately 0645 hrs.

I consider the failure to effect a landing was due to faulty equipment. When we got near the coast of France we were in face off the North beach instead of off the South. Men from the other A.L.C. and S.L.C. which go separated from us saw cliffs in the light of the searchlights and Verey lights. They evidently thought they were north of the unnamed river marked on the map. This was true but they were outside the boundary set for the operation.

I should like to emphasis that the spirit of the men was very high and that they are all longing for another chance.

**********************************************

Copy of memorandum of interview of Lieut. Smith with Mr. Saunders, Combined Operations Recorder.

Operation "ABERCROMBIE"

Lt. A.D.C. Smith, Adjutant to Major Lord Lovat, commanding Operation.

Lieutenant A.D.C. Smith:

We left Troon on 7th April, and reached Portsmouth at 12:00 noon, the party consisting of 100 men from he Commandos, and a small Canadian force from the Carleton and York Regiments.

The Commandos carried out a number of training exercises for the next few days, these being a rehearsal for the operation. They were conducted mostly from H.M.S. "Prince Albert". Everyone remained on board this vessel until about 18 hours in the evening, and during 10 days of rehearsal only 2 full nights' sleep were obtained.

The scheme was for the assault landing craft to act as flotilla, being towed until over the beaches by M.L.s. The first exercise was to make a landing on the Beaulieu River Bank. It was not very successful, for the M.T.B. towing A.L.C. ran aground.

The next exercise, on the following night, was more satisfactory, and a landing was about to be effected, and indeed had been partially carried out, on the beach opposite NETLEY HOSPITAL, when it was discovered that this part of the beach was kept very secret, and that the Commandos had had no business to practice on it. We were accordingly withdrawn in a hurry.

The next day we landed in the daylight at Cowes and carried out a series of exercises, the object being to cut still further the time it took to transfer from M.T.B. or M.G.B. to A.L.C. The practices were designed to teach how to establish a beach head perimeter, and thus to have a base from which to send out patrols.

A day or two later another landing was attempted at the Mouth of the Beaulieu. On this occasion the troops got ashore, but discovered that Beaulieu Spit was a bog, into which they sank up to their thighs. Much bad language was used.

In all these practices, not all of which were by any means successful, the object was to carry out as far as possible the movements which would be required during the operation.

Another exercise of the same kind was brought to naught by one of the M.G.B.s running aground.

During these days of practice it was usual to finish at about 3 a.m., and then to go to bed, breakfast being about 9:00. By the time these exercises had been in progress for about a week the Commandos were getting somewhat "browned off" because they did not know why they were being kept there or what they were supposed to do, since no inkling of the proposed operation had yet reached them.

On the 18th April the Commandos left Southampton in a transport ship, reaching Dover that night at about 2300 hours. They were housed in Drop Redout - a filthy place - for it did not appear to have been cleaned out for a long while. It was, however, ideal for the purpose of concealing the Commandos, for no one could get in or out except across the moat, and the only persons to do so were those supplied with special passes. In this redout the Commandos waited for orders. It was for the Vice-Admiral at Dover to decide just when the operation was to take place. The Commando Troops occupied their time priming grenades and collecting escaping gear. Everyone was in cracking good form.

At 1900 hrs the Commandos were taken in lorries to the submarine base at Dover Harbour, and embarked in some M.G.Bs. These numbered 4. There were 6 Assault Landing Craft and 2 S.L.C. The leader of the destroyer flotilla towed 2 D.L.Cs, one commanded by Lt. Cdr. M.G.B. The embarkation was completed about 1600 hrs BST, the troops being put on board 2 S.L.Cs. (Support Landing Craft) and 6 A.L.Cs (Assault Landing Craft). One of the two last A.L.Cs had a particularly brave leader, Mr. Mackinnon, R.N.V.R, who went into the battle in the company of Lord Lovat. There were 50 men in each M.G.B., and they reached the outer defences about 1930 hrs.

Before leaving Dover a regular Regatta took place, and there was no attempt for security. They embarked in the far part of Dover harbour, in full view of the town, and then frolicked about for hours.

About 2030 hrs the flotilla sailed, in broad daylight. The sea was really choppy, and the A.L.C. with Lt. Smith on board shipped a certain amount of water. The flotilla headed towards Dungeness, but at 2300 hours, when it was dark, the commanders noticed that the ships were constantly stopping because one A.L.C. frequently buried her whole nose in the water. Eventually one of the A.L.Cs went right under - perhaps because it got into the wash of the A.L.C. being towed in front of it. As Lt. Smith expressed it "It took a bit at a wave, and then went down and became full of water." Very soon the run ways were level with the sea. When this happened a cry went in "We are sinking". This A.L.C. was directly behind the M.G.B. towing it. The second A.L.C., astern of the first, and attached to it by a tow, at once slipped its tow and came up alongside the sinking A.L.C. By this time 4 naval ratings and 2 soldiers had climbed onto the engine house in the stern. In the confusion 2 naval ratings jumped overboard and were not seen again. The whole convoy stopped and there was a good deal of shouting. Lights had to be turned on. At this time the convoy was about 15 miles from the French coast. The A.L.C. remained afloat for about an hour. The convoy circled during this time, trying to find the 2 men, who had gone overboard, but without success. The decision was them made to return to port, and the flotilla made Dover again about 0300 hrs. Everyone was feeling very "browned off" and did not welcome Drop Redout, to which they repaired.

On Monday morning, 20th April, the Commando troops were informed that the decision whether or not the operation would take place that night, would be made know at 1500 hours. When that time came the operation was cancelled, but the period of the attack was extended by one day. Eventually, on Tuesday 21st, after a conference at Dover Castle, it was decided to carry on whatever the weather. Everyone was very keen, and the same procedure as on the first occasion was followed, without the ostentatious, regatta-like manoeuvres in the outer harbour. It was a perfect night, calm, but dark, for the moon was only a day or two old. There was a very slight mist over the water. The Commando was due to land on the French coast at 0130 hrs. This time everything at first went without a hitch. At 0115 hrs the A.L.Cs came alongside the M.G.Bs and the troops embarked on board them. Since, however, one A.L.C. had been sunk during the first attempt, the troops were very crowded.

The operation was a reconnaissance, the object being to find to the possibilities of landing on this particular stretch of coast. There was very little accurate information available. The plan was for the Commando troops to land on Red beach, to the North, while the Canadian troops landed on White beach to the South.

The A.L.Cs proceeded towards the shore running aboard the leading boat. Lt Smith was with Major Lord Lovat in the support landing craft. In point of fact direction was lost almost at once and the Commando troops landed about a mile too far North of Red Beach - some 300 yards from an unnamed stream. As we neared the land we could see high ground, and we knew, there-fore, that we were too far North and veered South, eventually landing, as I have said, about a mile from the position aimed at. The Canadians, who were supposed to go to White Beach tried to land still further North, and were therefore several miles from where they should have been. These mistakes were due either to a defect in the compasses, or to miscalculations. The Canadians were fired on, and did not eventually land. The Commandos landed at 0152 hrs, slightly late on schedule. The landing was carried out very quietly. The men were wearing gym shoes with very little equipment to hamper them. A great many were carrying Tommy guns, and carried 8 magazines with them. The first man of the S.L.C. to land was Major Lord Lovat, who tested the depth of the water.

He was out of his depth, and therefore hung on to the edge of the landing craft till he could walk. He then told the rest in a normal voice to get out. By this time the other troops had disembarked. We all got very wet. Major Lord Lovat was a very tall man and could walk in places where it was still out of the depth of the others. The signallers carried their wireless sets on their heads like African porters. Some of us when we got out found ourselves waist deep, and then thigh deep, and then shoulder deep, for the bottom of the sea was undulating. There was no sign of the enemy. We advanced in a very dignified way to the bottom of the dunes, crossing a fore shore about 200 yards wide.

The Commandos had been divided into 4 groups. 3 of them Were to form a beach head, with H.Q. in the middle, and 4 group was to take a patrol towards the high ground. Half an hour after landing some of 3 group were to send out a patrol to the South, and some of 1 group to the North. On landing, however, things were wrong. 4 group went out on its patrol intact, but the other 3 groups, instead of forming one beach head formed 3 all in line. This was probably due to the fact that the groups had been somewhat mixed up in embarkation, due to the loss of one of the A.L.Cs. The mistake, I consider, was almost unavoidable, for it was impossible to reform in the darkness, and it was therefore particularly difficult for the leader of Group 2 to collect his men, so as to form part of one beach head. H.Q. found themselves behind 1 group - it was in fact group number 1 and was on the extreme south of the party.

During all the landing and forming up on the beach no shots were fired. A few Verey lights went up and the Boche seemed suspicious. Then, however, fire broke out behind us to the South West, out to sea. We saw tracer bullets and Verey lights. They seemed quite close, and we got the impression that the Germans had discovered the Canadians and were opening fire upon them as they attempted to land on White Beach. In actual fact that was happening as that the Navy had encountered the German Flak ship. There were a few casualties, I understand, in one of the M.G.Bs. This affair out to sea led to a certain amount of confusion.

The plan was:

a. If the landing were unopposed them troops were to stay on shore for a maximum period of 2 hours.

b. If the landing were opposed, but not heavily, then troops were to spend 30 minutes ashore.

c. If the landing were heavily opposed then no attempt at landing was to be made.

It was understood that in the absence of orders to the contrary A. was to be put into operation. The signal to put B. into operation was to be the firing of a special rocket showing a red light over green. These signals could be sent up either from Red beach or White beach, and it was understood that booth beaches were to follow the same plan, whatever was happening on their own immediate fronts. We on Red beach though the naval battle was a signal to put plan B into operation, and were therefore in a difficulty because our patrol, consisting of number 4 group, was already out, and had been absent some 20 minutes. It consisted of about 25 men. It, therefore appears to me that at one time half the force though plan A. to be in operation, the other half plan B. We definitely adopted plan B, and eventually got through on the wireless, but not direct to the Canadians. We were told that the battle was a naval one, that the Canadians were not involved. There was therefore no reason to adopt plan B.

The naval battle died down in about 10 minutes, and we were left wondering whether the ships which had brought us there, and which were to take up off, had been sunk. At that moment a small German patrol of about 7 men came along the fore-shore from the direction of Hardelot. When they were about 30 yards away we both saw and heard them. Either they challenged us or we them, I am not sure which, I heard some one say "Let'em have it", and fire as opened, lasting for about 3 minutes. The Huns all flocked to the ground in a bunch. I though we made a mistake in remaining in the fore-shore and not going right up into the dunes. The Huns then ran, and I do not think any of them were hit. They never came back, and as far as I know there were no casualties on either side.

All this happened about half an hour after landing - i.e. about 0220 hrs. There was then a complete lull, and there was no taking except for the issue of necessary orders. Presently a searchlight pointed from the high ground to our left. It shone on one of our A.L.C.s but no fire was opened by the enemy. Our A.L.C. fired at it with a Bren gun.

We then received a wireless message from the flotilla leader saying that he was in rather a hot spot and asking to take us off before the pre-arranged hour. It was then about 0250 hrs. We replied that he could come in 10 minutes - i.e. at 0300 hrs. He was, however somewhat late, and at 0310 hrs we fired a rocket - red over green -, and the troops on either side came in towards us so that we eventually formed a single beach head. They were ordered to re-embark immediately, for it was decided to use them as cover in order to strengthen the perimeter, for there was still no sign of our patrol.

A little later we began to re-embark, wading in the sea up to our arm pits. The patrol, having seen the rocket returned in about 20 minutes and reembarked among the last to go aboard. I formed the impression that the Germans were very very thin on the ground. We all re-embarked, however, with one casualty, a man who was shot through both ankles through failing to answer a challenge, another who also failed to do so was lucky, because the Tommy gun pointed at him did not go off, as it was clogged with sand.

On the return journey the plan was to go helter skelter to Dungeness under our own power. It was slightly muddled. Everyone was wet through, but we jogged gaily towards England. Only one of the A.L.Cs could get both her
engines going.

It grew light about 0630. Then many aircraft appeared, and we were picked up by an M.L. about 0930. We got aboard the M.L. and we were all by that time wet and cold and were given tea, but the Captain of the M.L. said he would have to tow us to Dover. While we were making arrangements to do so an M.G.B. turned up. It took us on board and towed the A.L.C.s on to Dover, where we arrived about 1230.

Vice Admiral commanding at Dover came out to meet us in his barge. I gave him a preliminary report and we then all went back to the redout.

The story of the carpet slippers was that they were ordinary bedroom slippers, kept on the feet by strong elastic bands. Ennis, who wore them did so because he had no gym shoes.


Cheers