Well, not entirely correct, and I'm making a rather simplistic summary of it.
The Americans were routed at Kasserine suffering huge losses in men, material and armour, the day was only saved by the intervention of a hardened division of the Coldstream Guards that halted Rommel's advance and allowed the remaining US forces to withdraw.

The advice of the experienced British N. African commanders during the US planning for the offensive was cast aside in a somewhat arrogant manner and the US command assumed that Rommel was a wholly spent force, a huge mistake. US forces were of course entirely green and unexperienced.

Great things were expected from the M3 Grant tanks, not M4 Shermans, again ignoring the experiences of British forces previously operating these. The M3 suffered not only from being easily ignitable but being rivetted these detached and caused severe damage to the interior, and crew, when hit.

The connection that both the M3 and M4 burnt easily because of gasoline power is wholly erroneous, it is poor ammunition stowage and protection that causes the fires when shell propellant from burst cases is ignited. With the exception of the T34 and a few British/US variants, all WWII tanks were gasoline powered and did not necessarily burn readily.

The US learnt to be more flexible in their command structure and place less blind faith in armour after the battle, the general in command was relieved immediately afterwards also, having shown to be rather lacking.

There is a fair amount of material about Kasserine on the web.

R.