Quote:
Originally Posted by Dan Martel
Mike C, good to hear from you again.
As it happens I'm reading The D-Day Dodgers by Daniel Dancocks and came upon the following reference. Just to set the quote into context, it is December, 1944, and I Canadian Corps is conducting its last offensive before the onset of winter weather in the Po Valley of northern Italy. After a disastorous first battle under his command, the new Corps Commander (Charles Foulkes) is planning a set piece battle to force a crossing of the Lamone River.
The first attempt had lasted less than 12 hours before the Canadians were forced to withdraw, losing the better parts of the Royal Canadian Regiment and the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment in the process. Both battalion commanders, along with the commander of the 1st Brigade, were sacked.
After a new attempt to force a crossing of the Lamone, the Corps will have to cross four canals before reaching its objective, the Senio River. Both of the rivers and all four of the canals had steep banks, high dykes, and were in full flow due to the autumn rains. Plus, of course, the Germans.
It looks like this technique worked and that the shells detonated. Unfortunately there's no reference as to whether or not this was used in North West Europe.
Further to gun and howitzer trajectories, the following quote highlights the danger to troops in the front line from their own artillery, even if the surveying is done correctly. This occurred at the start of the first, and ultimately unsuccessful, crossing of the Lamone.
Best laid plans, and all that.
Dan.
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You should try 'The Regiment' by Farley Mowat, who was an officer in the Hasty Ps. The Ist Brigade was warned at very short notice to assault across the Lamone, after the first assault by 3rd Brigade attack had failed. The medium artillery was tasked to concentrate on houses immediately behind the high dykes on the far side of the Lamone, targets suited only to 25 pounders which could carry out high angle shoots, despite the objections of the artillery officers to the brigadier. There was insufficient time to give out orders properly. The acting CO of the Hasty Ps (the CO had been ordered by the brigadier to ensure the 2ic commanded for this attack - and three of the company commanders were inexperienced)) having no time at all for a recce, chose his start line as a ditch well back from the river, prominently marked on the only maps available, but which turned out to be visible only on the map, with the result that the leading two companies moved on (in the dark) right up to the friendly side dyke, where they were predictably clobbered by the medium artillery. The remaining two companies, further back, were then ordered to continue the assault, leaving the battalion with no reserves to counter the inevitable counter attack. No plan was instigated by brigade to get tanks, or even anti-tank guns across the river. If ever there was a disaster orchestrated by brigade, division and Corps, this was it. The casualties, of course, were all at battalion level.
As a minor detail, Stan Ketcheson, the acting CO of the Hasty Ps, was not sacked as he was wounded by mortars shortly after the battle.
Oh, and 67 of the Hasty Ps were killed, seriously injured or captured in that battle.
Chris