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Old 24-04-05, 11:19
Richard Notton
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Quote:
Originally posted by TColvin
I agree that all these were myths.

What seems to be true, however, is that Poland understood Britain and France would attack Germany. Therefore the Polish armed forces fought a delaying action to give the Anglo-French forces time to get their shit together. The attacks could have been directly into Germany across the Maginot Line by the Anglo-French armies and/or by the Royal Navy breaking into the Baltic.

Instead the Anglo-French forces did next to nothing, and failed even to study the German technique in order to prepare themselves for the onslaught in 1940.
I disagree.

You have to put your 1939 head on, not your 2005 head.

"This morning the British Ambassador in Berlin handed the German government a final note, stating, that unless we heard from them by 11 o'clock that they were prepared, at once, to withdraw their troops from Poland a state of war would exist between us. I have to tell you now that no such undertaking has been received and that consequently this country is at war with Germany."

Its like today's sanctions you have heard so much about in various situations that do very little, in 1939 most Brits would be reaching for their school atlas to see where Poland was and wondering how it even concerned us as British interests there were little more, if any, than a polite ambassadorial exchange; as for sending an effective army there with 1939 resources and logistics, a total non-starter practically and politically. Even later we only managed an "expeditionary" force of 158,000 men to France across a few miles of water.

How long did it take us now to establish effective "expeditionary" forces in the middle east recently, RO-RO ships, heavy lift jet aircraft et al?

What was Mr. Schickelgruber up to? The original intent was just the idea of Libenstraum, more living space, the re-joining/expansion of Germany as it was and some redressment for the humiliation of WWI especially against the French.

Whilst hating the Russians he cynically used them for his own ends to capture Poland and its resources, plus a bit of insurance that if the Wehrmacht didn't wholly suceed, then the Russians would and have given him half the country as agreed.

Turning to France, it seems that the intention was to envelope Belgium and just encircle the Maginot Line as a two-fingered salute to the French and a huge recoupment of national pride. At the time the French army was rated as formidable and it would have not been the plan to advance to the channel coast.

However, things seemed so easy, that thinking on the hoof, the Wehrmacht was allowed its head to carry on and indeed wholly out-run its logistic capability. The fall of France was aided by the poor command and desperate lack of comms from the top down, we should remember there was only one solitary phone line into Petain's HQ. In the one occasion when the British took direct command, Rommel's "Ghost Squadron" was nearly captured and was only saved by Rommel's direct intervention and a reversion to French command.

Barborossa wasn't even a dream at this time but I deduce Hitler was wholly seduced and misled by the apparent easy victory in France and thus turned on Russia in total misguided arrogance, but remember he de-mobilised a huge chunk of the Wehrmact after France and doubtless was oblivious or worse to the sound military counsel advising about the wisdom of attacking Russia.

I could theorise that the much vaunted and admittedly advanced German MVs were propaganda, most were designed and built well pre-war and I suspect on the aim of making a good world impression and not as a functional fighting vehicle; an area where the Russians excelled.

For example, look at the carefully structured range of half-tracks, well, three-quarter tracks accurately. You could include the Kettenkrad although this is really an airborne tractor designed to fit "Antie Ju"; however, they all have a fabulous track system with twin roller bearings per link with an integral cast oil reservoir and associated seals. Roller tipped drive sprockets with rubber track supports and off-set replaceable road pads to minimise wear through scuffing when laid on the road and of course the usual multitude of overlapping rubber tyred road wheels.

Why?

They whisper along in grandiose Berlin parades, it is inoffensive to Mr. Schickelgrubers ears and very impressive to the intelligence gatherers. You certainly can't hear Kevin Wheatcroft's 18 ton Famo coming as I well know.

We copied one and gave up; the OT-810 copied the Sd.Kfz.251 but with dry steel track.

Then there is the whole gamut of over-complicated and over-designed vehicles almost certainly not intended for battlefield duty, motor bikes and sidecars with selectable two wheel drive and reverse gear; 4 wheel steer small field cars? Hmmmmm.

Not seen on parade but similarly a pre-war design is the two man pulled infantry trailer, a nightmare of bent and angle welded tubing to carry a sheet steel box with coil springs and hydraulic dampers; comes complete with quickly detachable pop-off wheels and special straps to allow four men to carry it over fences and ditches; designed for war? I think not. Admittedly it did get simplified later, but not a lot.

Certainly Poland suffered very badly but to assume the British declaration of war on Germany was anything more at the time than severe posturing is a mistake, Hitler wasn't entirely mad then and would know full well that there wasn't a hope in hell that any effective counter-measure could be mounted in the time-scale, plus, it would have possibly set us off against the Russians by the same token. Win-win.

It would seem that politically and technically Germany had no intention of fighting a prolonged campaign, even the Blitskrieg technique was a very short-term action.

Leaving aside the moralistic questions and taking an entirely detached view, as policy to expand Germany and its resources which it was desperately short of, then the actions to capture half of Poland, re-join the Sudetenland and encompass the Maginot Line were well founded and their military had a sufficiency to achieve this.

The British declaration of war was a bit of a surprise and wholly unexpected as it made no sense in respect of Poland. Had it stopped there of course we could hypothesise that things would have been very different indeed.

R.
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