Find these paragraphs pertaining to the use of Canadian 17pdr Sherman Vc in the "CB" role on 6 Jun 44:
CMHQ Report No. 147 - Dated: 3 Dec 45 - prepared by Major J.R. Martin J.R.
122. The organization of 6 and 10 Cdn Armd Regts each into two
squadrons of D.D. tanks and one squadron of normal Shermans has been referred previously (para 73). This arrangement was designed to give close support to each assaulting battalion at the crucial moment of landing. Reserve battalions, making an unopposed landing, would be supported ashore, by "normal" squadrons. For a detailed description of the manner in which it was proposed to operate the amphibious tanks, reference should be made to the memorandum, Drill for Launching and Run in of DDs, issued by 2 Cdn Armd Bde, 13 Apr 44. (W.D., H.Q. 2 Cdn Armd Bde, 20 Apr - 31 May 44: Appx 44. (W.D., H.Q. 2 Cdn Armd Bde, 20 Apr - 31 May 44: Appx 11.) Launching was to take place at 5000 yards from the beach under cover of smoke laid by L.C.G. (L), touchdown being made at H minus 5 minutes. D.D. tanks were thus to form the first wave of the assault, going in five minutes before the landing flight of craft hit the beach. (See diagram at Appendix "H".) Although it was considered improbable that the operation would be mounted if seas were rough, it was nonetheless entertained as a possibility that the launching of D.D. tanks might have to be cancelled altogether. (Ibid.) 6 to 10 Cdn Armd Regts were each in addition to supply two Sherman tanks Vc to be employed as "concrete-busters" in the assault. These would be borne in L.C.T. (C.B.)(see ships and craft of Force "J", Appendix "B") and would disembark so as to deliver observed fire from their 17-pounder guns against emplacements. (R.C.A., 3 Cdn Inf Div O.O. No. 1.) Concretebusters would revert to regimental command on completion of their tasks. (2 Cdn Armd Bde O.O. No. 1.)
313. The diaries of the armoured regiment make no mention of the performance of L.C.T. (C.B.) One instance is recorded of a concretebuster engaging a casemate. (Lt.-Col Matheson, as above.) The commander of Force "J" further reported their fire to be very destructive when used against buildings. (C.B. 04385 B.)
AHQ Report No 54 - Dated: 30 Jun 52 - prepared by Lieutenant R.H. Roy.
103. The requirements of the assault phase necessitated complete reorganization of 6 and 10 Cdn Armd Regts (under the command, respectively, of 7 and 8 Cdn Inf Bdes). Two squadrons in each regiment were equipped with D.D. or swimming tanks (Sherman V Duplex Drive armphibious tanks), the third squadron retaining its normal Shermans, including five Sherman Vc (17-pounder). 27 Cdn Armd Regt, under command 9 Cdn Inf Bde, comprised three normally constituted squadrons, but with only four Sherman Vc per squadron.
157. The organization of 6 and 10 Cdn Armd Regts each into two squadrons of normal Shermans has bee referred to previously (para 103). This arrangement was designed to give close support to each assaulting battalion at the crucial moment of landing. Reserve battalions, jmaking an unopposed landing, would be supported ashore by “normal” squadrons. For a detailed description of the manner in which it was proposed to operate the amphibious tanks, reference should be made to the memorandum, Drill for Launching and Run-in of DDs, issued by 2 Cdn Armd Bde, 13 Apr 44 (W.D., H.Q. 2 Cdn Armd Bde, 20 Apr – 31 May 44: Appx 11). Launching was to take place at 5000 yards from the beach under cover of smoke laid by L.C.G. (L), touchdown being made at H minus 5 minutes. D.D. tanks were thus to form the first wave of the assault, going in five minutes before the leading flight of landing craft hit the beach (See diagram at Appendix “H”). Although it was considered improbable that the operation would be mounted if seas were rough, it was nonetheless entertained as a possibility that the launchng of D.D. tanks might have to be cancelled altogether (Ibid), 6 and 10 Cdn Armd Regts were each in addition to supply two Sherman tansk Vc to be employed as “concrete-busters” in the assault. These would be borne in L.C.T. (C.B.) (see Ships and Craft of Force “J”, Appendix “B”) and would disembark so as to deliver observed fire from their 17-pounder guns against emplacements (R.C.A., 3 Cdn Inf Div O.O. No. 1). Concrete-busters would revert to regimental command on completion of their tasks (2 Cdn Armd Bde O.O. No.1).
256. The diaries of the armoured regiments make no mention of the performance of L.C.T. (C.B.). One instance is recorded of a concrete-buster engaging a casemate ((HS) 145.2R11011(D4): Memorandum of Interview with Lt -Col F.M. Matheson). The commander of Force “J” further reported their fire to be very destructive when used against buildings (Report by Naval Commander, Force “J”).
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