[David_Hayward (RIP)]

Hanno may be interested to read the following which I have eventually found:

On 10th November 1939 StanEllis wrote once more to Colonel N.O. Carr, the letter being received in Ottawa via sea on 20 December. Prints had been sent as follows:
Canopy for 14-cwt. A.T. [Anti-Tank] Vehicles D.D. (V) 462/6
Box body and Canopy for 3-ton 6-wheeled truck S(V) 479, S(V) 175
F.B.E. Equipment-Lorry Body- D.D. (V) 337
Machinery Body D.D.-M-2306
Breakdown Body D.D. (V) 278, S(V) 337 and 343 and D.D. (V) 429, S(V) 343
Mounting details of lorry (technical) bodies were included as well. The significance of this letter is that Ellis went on to say that with the exception of the 15-cwt. canopy details, the other information would not be very useful

“..in view of the effort now being made to have the War Office furnish complete vehicles or bodies only for mounting on Canadian Chassis. This entire matter of technical vehicles and equipment is being pressed for a solution but in view of the acute shortage of vehicles and machinery no definite plan can be established until more is known of the War Office attitude towards the use of Canadian chassis”.

This reflects the W.D. belief in the supply of the Canadian 1st Division from British sources just as the Division had landed and were establishing themselves. On 25th September 1939, the High Commissioner in London, the Hon. Vincent Massey had written to the then Minister of Supply, Dr. Leslie Burgin, to presumably acquaint him of the offer by G.M. concerning the Southampton Plant[1] The Minister replied to the High Commissioner referring to the letter, and commented that the position was now that Colonel Loggie had

“agreed in principle that the Canadian Force will be equipped in Canada with vehicles generally interchangeable with those already in this Service, and that these will probably be built by General Motors, Canada, and Fords, Canada. So far as production capacity in this country is concerned, no difficulty is expected to arise after January next, when capacity should overtake our requirements”.[2]

Although this was meant to affirm that Canadian supply was not required, it also signified the belief that Canadian requirements would be met from British production, including for the 2nd Division which was being raised at that time. The official history states that in the early stages of the war, the British war effort was more or less self-sufficient. Indeed, whilst U.S. support was uncertain and British resources not yet fully taken-up, self-sufficiency was taken for granted more-or-less. However, from the beginning Canada had figured in British calculations of combatant strength and in British programmes of supply. The 1st Canadian Division was equipped almost entirely in the U.K. and doubts about the ability of Canadian industry to deliver goods quickly and shortage of dollars combined to keep British munitions programmes in Canada within very narrow bounds

[1] 25 September 1939: Letter: Hon. Vincent Massey, High Commissioner for Canada, London, to Dr. L. Burgin, Minister of Supply, File H.Q. 38-72-328 Vol. 2, C.N.A., ibid.

[2] 12 October 1939: Letter: Dr. L. Burgin to Hon. Vincent Massey, File H.Q. 38-72-328 Vol. 2, C.N.A., ibid.

However, there must have been a mistrust of Canadian abilities as the report of the Imperial General Staff of May 1940 stated in succinct terms that Britain required on American support if she was to avoid defeat after the fall of France.

I can only surmise that someone in the corridors of Whitehall realised that Ottawa would accept Sterling for Canadian purchases. Even so the Treasury Foreign Exchange Requirements Committee minutes show that there was a recurring belief that the British should order from the US, even after all of the French orders that had not been delivered were diverted to British account.