Thread: Dunkirk
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Old 31-08-17, 12:01
Lang Lang is offline
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Guderian was unhappy because his forward units had crossed the river towards Dunkirk but they were not a strong organised force and running far ahead of the supply system and with exposed flanks. Guderian saw himself as taking out the whole British army to his everlasting glory (and he may well have done if let run but he was on thin ice). He thought he had been stopped while he was on a roll and he had an axe to grind and a motive to avoid criticism by blaming Hitler.

The decision to stop was Rundstedt's who was looking at the whole picture of the battle for France not just the Dunkirk pocket. He convinced Hitler that the armour risked heavy losses in the muddy going and was needed in the bigger battle and the tail had to catch up to the dog. The order to stop came from Hitler after he agreed with Rundstedt's assessment.

At this stage Goering stepped in and volunteered the Luftwaffe and it is natural that the order to stop indicated the battle would continue from the air - nobody was being let off the hook.

It became apparent that the defenses were getting organised and the ground forces needed to get going again, Luftwaffe or no Luftwaffe. Only 3 days after the stop order Brauchitsch the Commander in Chief of the German Army convinced Hitler to endorse an order to renew the advance, which they did.

They were always going to make Dunkirk a ground battle - they had built 5 bridges over the river in preparation - and the Luftwaffe were in use to keep the pressure on. Goering and his PR machine might have promoted a total victory from the air but it was never going to happen and the Luftwaffe generals never claimed such a possibility. Nobody in the world at that time knew the capabilities and limitations of massed air attacks as a major battle winning tactic and it is not unreasonable that Hitler agreed to go along with Goering's super optimism.

The effect of the 3 (4 before they actually got rolling) days was to change Dunkirk from a fleeing rabble gathering point to an organised, very tough defensive ring that held on long enough to allow the huge numbers to escape before capitulating.

The defensive ring, of course was sacrificed, with not only French units but the whole 51st Highland Division marching into prison camps. The generals, both French and British, who organised the defenses at such short notice and to such effect are the heroes of the day but they are little known or acknowledged.

Lang

Last edited by Lang; 01-09-17 at 08:24.
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