Quote:
Originally Posted by Mike Cecil
The Int estimate values are interesting as this intelligence figure is then used to calculate what it would take to counter that Int estimated production - ie how many tanks are we going to need to combat the 'X' tanks produced by the enemy in the last 12 months, minus what we know we have destroyed?
Such a figuring may well have delayed operations pending an Allied build up to a suitable level to ensure success against what the Intelligence people thought the enemy could field (rather than what they could field).
And where on earth did the intelligence boffins think the Germans were hiding all those tanks?? 
Mike |
I doubt reality entered some peoples' minds.
One complication to the tank number estimates has to battlefield regeneration of losses. We know that Normandy was fought with tank mostly made in 1942 and 43. The resupply depots were staged to replenish losses after the units were withdrawn. The battles in 1944 and 45 were fought with tanks that survived or were knocked out, recovered, repaired and reissued, and with new builds. The introduction of new designs was resisted because of the bother of retraining and establishing parallel lines, and sustaining the momentum of equipping regiments with Shermans. The following link amply details the business of replenishing combat regiments with Shermans
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewconte...00&context=cmh.
In the context of German losses, they invariably lost ground in combat after DDay. Any vehicles knocked out were abandoned on the battlefield, which meant their replenishment calculations could scarcely include salvage and returning tanks to front line units. So, their factories had to be very productive to keep up with demand, regardless of availability estimates.