Carpiquet

[John McGillivray]

A new book just came out last month by Marc Milner called “D-Day to Carpiquet The North Shore Regiment and the Liberation of Europe”. As the title suggests, the book covers the actions of The North Shore Regt during the period from the 6th of June until the 5th of July. Of particular interest is the Chapter dealing with the battle of Carpiquet on the 4th and 5th of July. Most accounts of the battle fail to take into account the importance of the high ground on which Carpiquet was located; and underestimates the size of the forces that the Germans committed to the battle and the high numbers of their losses. Often ignored are the five failed counterattacks launched by the 1st and 3rd Battalions of 1st Panzer Grenadier Regiment of Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler.

Mr. Milner concludes the chapter as follows:

“Operation WINDSOR is usually regarded as a dismal failure because the southern hangers and control buildings were not taken, and because Canadian casualties were so high compared to those of the Germans. And the Canadian assault on Carpiquet village itself is often viewed as an example of bungling Allied methods: four full battalions supported by massive firepower and tanks attacking a depleted German battalion resulting in minimal success and heavy losses. It is generally assumed that the Germans lost 155 men in the first two days of fighting at Carpiquet, a figure which contrasts sharply with the 377 Canadians who were killed, wounded, or missing.

“However, although disappointing, particularly in its failure to secure the southern hangers, Operation WINDSOR was a significant tactical, operational, and even strategic success. Indeed, the battalions of the 8th Brigade held onto Carpiquet and drew both a maelstrom of fire and savage German counter-attack onto their position. At a certain level, that was entirely the point. The Allies, including those diehards of the NSR who made it to the village, knew that the Germans would fight fanatically to retake it. The SS attackers in the early hours of July 5 were told that no one could withstand the constant shelling and that they would find Carpiquet empty. As Major J.A.L. Robichaud said, the Germans "got a very sad surprise."

“Not only did the Germans fail to dislodge the Canadians from their salient, they also suffered heavily at Carpiquet. The figure of 155, routinely quoted by historians on both sides as the German count of killed, wounded, and missing, refers to only those admitted to by the 26th PzG Regiment of 12th SS, and is inaccurate. By some accounts, German losses around the southern hangers attacked by the RWR amounted to 150 men, while the reinforced third company of the 3/26th in the village was virtually annihilated: the NSR captured fifty-five and counted about thirty-five SS dead in the wheat field. How many died in the village is unknown, but there must have been some. Those figures amount to 240 from the 12th SS alone. More importantly, for some unknown reason, losses to the 1st SS Division during the morning of July 5 are never tallied in the Carpiquet figures. According to their own history, the 3rd Battalion of the 1st SS PzG Regiment lost 115 infantry (killed, wounded, and missing) plus about twenty tanks. This figure is corroborated by B Company of the NSR, who counted about one hundred dead and wounded in front of its position at dawn. These losses bring German casualties for July 4-5 to about 340. But the real figure is probably higher still. The Germans provide no casualty figures for their supporting tanks and other units, none from the three attacks by the 1st Battalion of the 1st SS PzG Regiment at all, and we can only speculate on the casualties from the artillery fire brought down on formations preparing to attack, such as the 3rd Company of the III/1 st SS just outside Franqueville at the start of the first attack. Based on all this, casualties on both sides were about even, and the SS paid dearly for their fanatical disregard for life, especially their own, and for their arrogance in the face of Anglo-Canadian defensive firepower.

“More importantly, in trying to retake Carpiquet the Germans committed their only available operational reserve in the Caen sector, and it was destroyed. As the Canadian Army's official post-war narrative reveals, four out of five of these attacks fell on the North Shore Regiment, and the fifth was stopped by their intervention. It was their fire, and that of their supporting elements, that crushed the elite of Hitler's personal guard and shattered German hopes of holding Caen. The old North Shore may have died at Carpiquet, but it took a lot of Germans and its enemy's plans for the defence of Caen with them. As Major Bill Harvey reflected, "There was never the like of those North Shore men for sheer guts and durability."”

To add to what Marc Milner wrote, the losses of the 1st Bn of 1st SS is given in the book “The Leibstandarte IV/1” by Rudolf Lehmann and Ralf Tiemann as 19 dead, 76 wounded and 21 missing. This brings the known German losses to more than 450.

Another part of Operation Windsor was a raid conducted by A Sqn of the Sherbrooke Fusiliers commanded by Radley-Walters. The SFR Sqn’s start line was near Villeneuve. They shot up German positions at Franqueville, Authie and Gruchy and crossed back through the Canadian’s lines near Rosei. They destroyed two German anti-tank guns and accounted for some 75 German troops from 25th Pz Gn Regt., with no losses to themselves. This brings the German losses during Operation Windsor to well over 500.