Chevys of the Indian Long Range Patrol

[Lang]

I think you have a winner Mike.

Lang

[David_Hayward (RIP)]

Lang, you may be right...but the information I have from various papers acquired over the years does suggest that the War Office were responsible for the Indian Army and as regards vehicles, they were to be responsible for payment.

Now, two files come to mind in the National Archives that are of relevance here:

a) A Treasury Exchange Requirements Committee file which relates to providing dollars to pay for the Egyptian Chevrolets.

b) A file relating to vehicles assembled for Afghanistan paid for by the Afghan Government Purchasing Commission inn New York including in 1940-41, which were assembled by Ford and GM of India in Bombay. These were US-sourced and assembled by the respective subsidiaries: Fords were a GM OF CANADA subsidiairy, which itself was only partly-owned by Ford of Dearborn, although GM India was a subsidiary of the New York GM Corporation. This tying-up of assembly capacity, which the companies rigourously defended, rankled the WO and yet nothing could be done. That is until a decisionn was made that all output was required for the war effort, that the Afghans could 'poke it' and be paid for their purchases which would be diverted to the British (for the Indian Army and British Army in India). It rankled that these vehicles were being assembled in Bombay then driven north over the Khyber Pass..and there was concern that German agents were around as well.

[David_Hayward (RIP)]

Herewith from two files in fact:

In January 1940 the Canadian Minister of Finance complained bitterly through the High Commissioner in London to the Secretary of State for the Dominions, Anthony Eden, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer that a Ford of Canada order for 2,300 trucks to be supplied through Ford in Bombay had been curtailed [although in fact halved], because of lack of Canadian dollar exchange. To make matters worse Ford at Dagenham had been contracted to provide the vehicles, thus resulting in aggravation of the India-Canada imbalance of trade, and an adverse effect on Ford of Canada. One Civil Servant succinctly announced ‘I am afraid that it is the diversion of the balance of the orders to the Ford Company in England which is the real source of irritation in this case’ . The response also summed up the situation perfectly:

This is an awkward business. There is already a long history, since the outbreak of war, of sensitiveness on Canada’s part and of friction with her in regard to reductions in Canadian exports to this country which have been necessitated by war conditions; and she has argued that her war effort must be adversely affected by interference with her internal economy.

After much discussion at high level the Duke of Devonshire and the Chancellor wrote to explain that the vehicles were for the mechanisation of the army in India, part of a pre-war process, and the British ‘taxpayers’ were footing the bill. Although a proportion of the requirement had been placed with Canada, the rest was intended to obviate the need for redundancies in Dagenham. It was acknowledged though that the matter could have been dealt with more sensitively; this was regrettably indicative of the concerns over dollar exchange that resulted in the blinkered belief in domestic production being able to satisfy requirements, lack of appreciation of continuing Canadian economic assistance to the U.K. and the need to keep the Canadian industries rolling with consecutive orders in addition to Canada’s own. As detailed below, large numbers of Canadian Fords were indeed procured by the British for delivery to Bombay but this was then rescinded possibly because the Indian Army had brought to Egypt a quantity of Chevrolets [1940 Models at least] which then became the responsibility of the W.D. That in turn meant the E.R.C. had to agree to a Ministry of Supply request for dollars to purchase spare parts for them from G.M. Near East and also R.A.O.C., R.A.S.C. and other units that were using Chevrolet trucks as well. Payment in Egyptian Pounds in Egypt required immediate purchase of [U.S.] dollars by Near East and therefore technically this required dollar exchange consent. The reason for this is explained above, namely that all transactions between G.M. subsidiaries had to be made in dollars through New York, and that required dollar purchases. Apart from the £10,000 for the spares for the latter’s vehicles, a running contract of expenditure up to £14,000 per year was agreed to with ‘G.M. Limited’ {sic.) as required by the Army in Egypt. The payments could have been made in pounds in Egypt, or to Southampton who then telegraphed the sums to Alexandria, and then Near East in turn purchased dollars to pay New York! The sum was agreed by the E.R.C. because there was no hope of supplying small quantities of spare parts for these vehicles with ‘any degree of efficiency’.

However by August 1940 and with the entry of the Italians into the war, the Mediterranean was closed to U.S. shipping; Near East could no longer obtain supplies and G.M. required purchases for the Army to be made through the B.P.C. in New York. Impressments increased the number of Chevrolets being used, and $137,000-worth of spare parts covering 5 months’ requirements was purchased from local agents. Further purchases of spares were required and $130,000 was requested to be authorised to purchase 8 months’ worth of stock, at say $16,000 per month, or $200,000 p.a. E.R.C. consent was then requested for the immediate purchase of spares to $130,000 and for purchases to cover monthly demands for spare parts

[David_Hayward (RIP)]

I wonder, on reflection, what vehicles Ford at Dagenham sent to India? CKD presumably, but what type? Presumably W0T models?

[David_Hayward (RIP)]

This is what happened to the intended Bombay deliveries:

To illustrate the urgency of the demand for Canadian trucks, reference is made to the M. of S. contracts: Supply/Mechanical [abbreviated ‘S.M.’ or ‘S/M’] 2002 to 2006 which were placed in June 1940 in Ottawa. S/M. 2002 was intended to cover 3,500 15-cwt. Fords for Bombay, and the same number of Chevrolets for England ; S/M 2003 1,500 30-cwt. Fords for Bombay and 1,500 Chevrolets for England ; S/M 2004 was for 3-Tonners, 5,742 Ford trucks, 66 Ford Stores, 86 Wreckers and 86 Machinery for England , and S/M 2005 [Bombay] and 2006 [England] covered 4,787 Chevrolet trucks split 3,829 for Bombay and 958 for England, with 57 Stores, Wreckers and Machinery for Bombay and 14 of each for England. The bodies and chassis were to be boxed separately and marked accordingly after the case number: one body and one chassis were required to be shipped together to form one unit. By 28 August, this had all changed with 9,000 of the 21,000 ordered going to Egypt and Mombasa on the instructions from Ottawa : S/M 2002 required 3,000 Ford 15-cwt. for Egypt , 500 for Mombasa, and 3,500 Chevrolets for England; 2003 became 1,200 30-cwt. Fords for Egypt and 300 for Mombasa, with 1,500 Chevrolets for England ; 2004 was for 5,742 3-Ton Ford trucks plus 86 of each of Stores, Wreckers and Machinery , and finally 2005 became 4,787 Chevrolet 3-Ton trucks split 3,150 for Egypt, 670 for Mombasa and 967 for England, with 71 Stores, Wreckers and Machinery split 50 for Egypt, 10 for Mombasa and 11 for England in each case. The W.O. Census shows that S/M 2006 was issued for 30-cwt. 4 x 2 G.S. [General Service] trucks, totalling 193 units. Further, S/M 2002 totalled 3,211 registered Chevrolet units with 1,500 Chevrolets under S/M 2003.

[David_Hayward (RIP)]

I am now checking my papers from a duty filing cabinet but here's the balance for you for the moment:

The initial suggestion for the re-allocation of the Bombay deliveries was because the W.O. hurriedly changed priority in August 1940 for the Middle East to be supplied, with vehicles being issued to the Indian Army in Egypt. However the evidence now shows that the Australian Infantry Force [A.I.F.] in Egypt were issued with trucks and lorries from these earliest British orders in addition to the British and Indian forces. Confirmation of the delivery in January 1941 of the ‘Egypt’ deliveries appears to come from a M. of S. note of 31 January 1941 stating that the War Office had decided to establish four unit plants in the Middle East for assembly of vehicles purchased ‘in America’ {sic} and shipped direct to the Middle East; further that vehicles were already being delivered and the provision of assembly plants was a matter of urgency. Permission was sought to spend £75,000 or $300,000 for five 1 or 2-ton revolving caterpillar-type cranes, trailers for the cranes, petrol-engined battery-charging plant, petrol-engined air compressor plant, sets of hand tools and 9 5-ton platform lorries and spare parts multiplied by four for each plant

[Lang]

David,

This is very interesting.

I wonder if the diversion to the Australians was a finger in the dyke attempt to put off the day UK became US Dollar (and in fact gold) bankrupt, which would have been about this time. I think Australia had used up most of its US dollar credits also but still had gold reserves which could be spent for the great cause.

India on the other hand would have been milked for every last dollar and international gold credit by the Home Government and had none to pay GM and Ford.

GM and Ford had no illusions about the credit-worthiness of their customer and it was only good business sense for them to demand cash on delivery.

Roosevelt's Lend Lease saved the day and the rest is history.

I can see why the Canadians were getting uppity with a threat of being sucked into the British financial quicksand.

This probably bores the rest of the MLU mob but I think it is really fascinating.