7th Recce vehicle question

[dfuller52]

I am researching a member of the 7th Recce Regt. who served in 'C' Squadron. He landed on June 6, 1944, and was killed July 9. Can anyone tell me what vehicle his unit was equipped with? I have seen pictures of Shermans (or were they Stuarts?) but then I have also noted other vehicles that they might have used.

His training for D-Day involved combined ops/signals exercises and he was qualified as a driver who also had radio experience.

Thanks.

[John McGillivray]

Here is a link to a site that gives the establishment of the Recce Regiment in a British Infantry Division. 7th Recce would in general be the same as this but with some minor differences in detail. Sorry no tanks.

http://truxmodels.co.uk/page16.html



This is from the regimental history of the 7th Recce Regiment.

D-DAY

To tell the story of a. Reconnaissance Regiment in the Second World War is an extremely difficult proposition, for unlike an Infantry Battalion or an Armoured Regiment, it operated with few exceptions, as independent Squadrons working in close conjunction with the various Brigades of the Division. Sometimes, as in the case of the Contact Detachments and the Beach Group, it sent special parties of Officers and Men to do special work for the G.O.C. Therefore, to cover all the various actions participated in by members of the Regiment; it becomes necessary to deal with these groups individually.

BEACH GROUP
When, at about midnight, June 5th, 1944, the massive assault force weighed anchor and set sail, there were, spread out among the various types of landing craft, two groups of 17th Hussars. Both of these groups had vitally important jobs to do — jobs for which they had trained for months. One of these, officially called the Beach Exit Recce Parties, was divided into two sections and attached to two British Beach Groups. With the Fifth Royal Berkshire Regiment were Maj. C. W. MacLean, D.S.O., Lt. K. C. Rowe, Lt. O. McKenna, Lt. R. Thomson, Lt. L. Clarke, and Tpr. R. L. Sarvis; and, with the 8th Bn. (Irish) King's Own Rifles were Maj. W. C. Bowen, Lt. L. K. Crabtree, M.C., Lt. T. Brunstrom, M.C., Lt. N. R. Johnson, Lt. H Banks and Tpr. R. Wilcox.

It was common knowledge throughout the Unit that these members were to perform some sort of "traffic control" and, for this job, they were compelled to wear white web-belts while on their steel helmets they were ordered to paint a conspicuous "T.C." Naturally enough, whenever these weird specimens appeared, rude remarks were passed about them having joined the Provost Corps. In fact, the task they were undertaking was far more important than their commonly accepted title "Traffic Control" led people to believe.

First, they were to land with the assaulting infantry, locate exits where all the Divisional Battle vehicles could pass through the sea walls, barbed-wire, mines, etc., and then be responsible to the 3rd Division that all the carriers, guns, tanks, etc. got off the beach and into the forming up areas. This, of course, meant that each Officer was required to have a complete knowledge of all the vehicles in the Division, where they were loaded and exactly what their job was to be after they landed.

At 0630 hrs., the LCA (Landing Craft Assault) of "J Force" were lowered to the sea and started the very rough journey towards land. Each Officer was on a different craft, to land at various points throughout the beach sector. It is difficult to tell, just exactly who was the first member of the 17th Hussars to set foot on French soil, however, after the Navy, Air Force and Artillery had pounded the beach defenses into powder, the tiny craft "touched down", and the Infantry went to work on the enemy. Twenty minutes later the Traffic Control Officers landed and here is their story as told by Maj. C. W. MacLean, D.S.O.:—

"In the water ahead of us lay thousands of under-water obstacles with teller mines and various types of shells attached to them. Lt. Rowe and Lt. McKenna landed with the Assaulting troops at St. Aubin-sur-mer. Lt. Crabtree and Lt. Brunstrom at Courseulles-sur-mer, Maj. Bowen, Lt. Johnson, Lt. Banks in the second wave a few hundred yards west of Courselles, Lt. Thompson, Lt. Clarke and I also in the second wave, at Bernieres-sur-mer.

Approaching the beaches we were met with a most impressive sight. The fight was in full swing and later we found the pill-boxes still firing at the craft, which were hung up on Element "C". In our craft we all wondered why they didn't lower the ramp and let us out, but the answer soon came when the craft hit the mines and blew apart and we dashed through water up to our shoulders to the sea wall.

Finally the assaulting troops succeeded in getting over the wall and into the town, then we started looking for possible vehicle exists. With the aid of Bulldozers and flails, temporary exits were made and later, the follow-up troops, A/T guns, carriers, tanks etc., started to roll through. Our wireless between the Officers at each exit failed completely and there was no way of knowing if and how other beaches were making out. Tpr. Sarvis dropped his heavy equipment and with his rifle, set out to get this information. This was a very brave undertaking and was entirely of his own will.

He returned later to say that he had found Lt. Thompson dead in his assault craft and Lt. Rowe wounded but still working at his exit. (Lt. Rowe, incidentally, was wounded two more times before being evacuated and for this gallant action received a mention in Dispatches.) Lt. McKenna was alone to operate his entire beach, pretty much shaken by the blast of a mine set off by a tank. In the meantime, I had found Lt. Clarke working at the other exit on my beach.

The equipment was coming in much more quickly now, and the beaches presented a picture of confusion as the exits began to clog up.
Lt. Brunstrom was having some real difficulty as he was on a very well-defended sector of the beach, but did an excellent job of keeping the exits running smoothly.

Further down the coast, Maj. Bowen, having experienced the same sort of landing, had very heavy mortar fire to add to his difficulties. At the same time, he had the responsibility of having to shepherd a special "task force" through this fire and past an 88 rnm. gun in a pill-box.

Mines just over the sea-wall were the greatest nuisance as vehicles would blow up on the exit, and we would have to search out the trusty bull-dozer to clear the mess away. The work seemed endless and the confusion greater each time we looked down the beach. However, by 1500 hrs. things were running smoothly and the major part of our work was finished.

It was not till the following morning that both groups met and found that our job had been successfully carried out with only three casualties — Lt. Thompson, killed, Lt. Rowe, wounded and Lt. Crabtree, missing. Lt. Crabtree, it was established later, had been blown out of his craft when it went up on an under-water mine and was hauled out of the sea by a destroyer, unhurt but suffering from shock and exposure.

Their work finished, the Beach Group reported to Divisional Headquarters where they filled in the ranks of the much-depleted Liaison Officers.

CONTACT DETACHMENTS
While the Beach Group were trying to untangle the unholy messes on the beaches, there was another body of 17th Hussars doing an altogether different job. These Officers and other ranks were known as the Contact Detachments and their task was one of immense importance. To explain their employment clearly, it is necessary to go back a bit to the early days of combined Operations.

As far back as the Libyan Campaign, it was realized that once a Commander had committed his initial assault force, the maintenance of liaison became a very difficult business. This was mainly because the Officer commanding the Battalions, which was actually doing the fighting, was much too occupied to be bothered with sending back the information required by the Commander to enable him to commit his reserves, Out of this was formed the much-heard-of "Phantom".

During various Combined Operations and the training for them, it was similarity acknowledged that the G.O.C. of an Assault Division, operating from a ship some five miles off shore, seldom knew the exact state — the successes or failures — of his battalions fighting inland. His regular Liaison Officers were useless, as they could not dash back and forth from land to ship. He could not visit the Battalions himself. His Wireless Communications set-up might, or might not work; and, if it did, what guarantee was there that the Battalion Commanders would use it, they themselves being too engaged with the enemy. Without this vital information, it was impossible for the G.O.C. to commit his reserve Brigade; a tactical move which must be done at the right place, at the right time, quickly and with confidence.

With this problem to overcome, 21 Army Group, commanded by General Montgomery decided that, as the Divisional Reconnaissance Regiments, as such would not be used on the Assault, they would supply Officers and wireless operators to be attached to the various Units of the Division and whose primary task would be to see that the Divisional commander was kept informed at all times as to just what his Battalions were doing.

In the 3rd Canadian Division, then, the 17th Hussars were to carry out this task. Long before D-Day, the Detachments were sent to the Units they were to go into action with. Each Detachment was equipped with a jeep, a No. 22 crystal-controlled, wireless set, a No. 68R, crystal-controlled set, batteries and a chore-horse. One of these Detachments, consisting of an Officer, a Corporal and two operators, was attached to each of the assaulting battalions, one to each of the reserve battalions, and one to each of the Brigade Headquarters and Divisional Headquarters. All of the "stations" operated on the same frequency, and were therefore able to intercept all messages passed to Divisional Headquarters. As the Officers were only concerned with passing information, and not with fighting, it made the net a very valuable and closely tied-up organization.

The Detachments were dispersed throughout J-Force's ships in the following manner:—

DIV. H.Q. SHIP
Capt. G. V. Newsam, Lt. M. Telford, Sgt. K. T. Williams, Tpr. A. Roach, Tpr. E. Rivers

7th BRIGADE H.Q.
Lt. J. O. Borlase, Cpl. J. Raich, Tpr. T. A. Poole, Tpr. K. Saunders, Tpr. F. Gordon, Tpr. R. Ryan

REGINA RIFLES
Lt H. R. Turley, Cpl. R. Marcoux, Tpr. R. Squires, Tpr. E. Johnson

ROYAL WINNIPEG RIFLES
Lt. R. K. Smith, Cpl. D. Paul, Tpr. J. Mackenzie, Tpr. M. Faille

8th BRIGADE H.Q.
Lt. C. L. Lynch, Cpl. C. L. Jones, Tpr. K. Boyd, Tpr. R. Nairn, Tpr. W. Morrow, Tpr. J. Wilkinson

QUEEN'S OWN RIFLES
Lt. W. V. O. LeBlanc, Cpl. G. L. Gilkinson, Tpr. W. Cummings, Tpr. R. Robinson

NORTH SHORE REGIMENT
Lt. C. W. Doulton, Cpl. L. T. Christie, Tpr. F. Marsolux, Tpr. R. Hilliard

9th BRIGADE H.Q.
Lt. W. G, H. Pavey, Cpl. H. H. Smith, Tpr. R. H. Munkittrick, Tpr. A. Murphy

HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY OF CANADA
Lt. V. W. Stannard, Cpl. J. Rosenfeld, Tpr. O. Costin, Tpr. M. Siampis

STORMONT DUNDAS & GLENGARRY HIGHLDS
Lt. W. Greenwood, Cpl. D. Rothwel,l Tpr. S. Humby, Tpr. R. Taylor

NORTH NOVA SCOTIA HIGHLANDERS
Lt. J. W. Thompson, Cpl. D. O. Baker, Tpr. L. Dionne, Tpr. L. Nassar

RESERVE DET.
Lt. W. R. Mason, Cpl. J. Davies, Tpr. J. W. Sinclair, Tpr. T. Pettibone

It is significant to note, while observing how well the Detachments functioned, that the first message received in the Divisional Operations room after H-Hour was one sent by Lt. Turley. It read "D D Tanks have touched down". This, of course, meant that in the Regina sector the swimming tanks had landed. This began a long series of messages, which when put together, painted a picture which went a long way towards helping the G.O.C., Maj.-Gen. R. Kellor, make his decision.

Unfortunately, the information from the Winnipegs ceased coming in altogether, for, not only was that Battalion taking very heavy casualties, but Lt. R. K. Smith had been badly wounded, his operator, Tpr. Mackenzie, had also been nicked and his man-packed 68R set completely smashed.

Over on the left, 8 Brigade was getting along a little better and Lt.'s LeBlanc and Doulton were sending back reams of valuable information. A word must be said here for the fine work of Cpl. Gilkinson, who, though he had been wounded in the heel, carried on for two days before he decided that the time could be spared to have an M.O. patch up his, by now, badly swollen foot.

Finally, while Lt's Bbrlase and Turley were passing back stories of "heavy M.G. fire" — "stiff opposition" — etc., Lt's. Lynch, Doulton and LeBlanc announced that the Brigade had managed to seize the first objective, "YEW".
With this established, the G.O.C. landed the 9th Brigade behind the 8th Brigade with orders to push on to the Divisional Objective — Carpiquet Airfield. With those orders, the work of those Detachments with the 9th Brigade began. Their story is much the same as those of the other Detachments. The first information about the meeting up with heavy enemy armoured formations near Authie was labeled "Contact Detachments N.N.S. Highlanders" while it was Contact Detachments who announced the consolidation of the 9th Brigade in Villons-les-Buissons. From D-Day until 31st July, when they rejoined their Regiment, these Detachments remained as the G.O.C.'s representatives at his Battalions and Brigades. The only proof of the reliable work they did being the fact that, as long as Maj.-Gen. Kellor was in command of 3 Canadian Division, he never committed it to battle without calling on the 17th Hussars for Contact Detachments. Later they were again used, with great success for the crossing of the Rhine.

The story of Contact Detachments is not complete, however, without the tale of Lt. Bill Mason's narrow escape. Mason, being reserve Detachment had been ordered to take over Lt. Smith's job with the Royal Winnipeg Rifles as soon as it had been established that that Officer had been wounded. By the time he was ordered to go to them, they had reached the town of Putot-en-Bessin, on the Caen — Bayeux Highway. Unfortunately, during the time that Mason had taken to locate them, they had suffered an extremely severe counter-attack, been completely overrun by tanks, been so badly cut up, in fact that, for the next day or so, they were not considered to be on the Divisional Order of Battle. At any rate, Lt. Mason, as ordered, arrived at Putot-en-Bessin, complete with jeep, wireless sets, operators and sten guns. Needless to say, he was somewhat alarmed to find, not the Royal Winnipeg Rifles there, but members of the 12 SS Panzer Division sitting in their Panther tanks. When asked later, "What did you do, Bill", his laconic reply was, "What would you do?" Lt. Mason then, not having any Winnipegs to go to joined the 1 Canadian Scottish Regiment with whom he stayed until July 31st.