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Old 03-08-14, 15:21
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Default FYI-an analysis of US efforts in Afghanistan

NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE www.nationalreview.com

July 30, 2014 4:00 AM

Up in Smoke
A new report shows that America got little for $104 billion spent in
Afghanistan.

By Jim Geraghty

http://www.nationalreview.com/articl...e-jim-geraghty

This Wednesday, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction, John F. Sopko, unveiled a comprehensive review that offers a
dark outlook for the future of Afghanistan, concluding "long-standing and
pervasive corruption could destroy the country's prospects," with many signs
that the Afghan government will not be "self-sustaining" after coalition
military forces leave.

The report identified major problems in the Afghan government's ability to
pay for basic services, the Afghan military's ability to operate and
maintain U.S.-provided equipment, efforts to control opium production and
the drug trade, and any ability to utilize the country's natural resources.

Sopko and his staff operate separately from the Pentagon and have authority
to review and audit any Afghan reconstruction activity performed by the U.S.
government - the Department of Defense, the U.S. State Department, and the
U.S. Agency for International Development and its contractors.

The report begins with the eye-opening statistic that the U.S. has spent in
Afghanistan a sum now comparable to the amount spent on the Marshall Plan to
reconstruct 16 European countries after World War II. The $12.7 billion the
U.S. spent on that project by 1951 would be about $116 billion in today's
dollars; Congress has appropriated more than $104 billion for the
reconstruction of Afghanistan.

And it's not over. "Despite the drawdown of U.S. and Coalition forces [from
Afghanistan], our mission there is far from over," Sopko declares in the
report. "With almost $18 billion appropriated but not yet spent in the
pipeline, and probably another $6 to $10 billion promised annually for years
to come, Afghanistan reconstruction should still be relevant to every U.S.
taxpayer and policy maker."



The report does not offer a hopeful outlook for Afghanistan as the U.S.
continues to draw down the number of troops in the country. One inescapable
problem is budgetary: The Afghan government doesn't collect taxes well at
all and the black market remains a key portion of the economy. The report
concludes, "If the Afghan government dedicated all of its domestic revenue
toward sustaining the Afghan army and police, it still could only pay for
about a third of the associated costs. Built into many projects are
requirements for parts and fuel that the Afghans cannot afford and technical
skills that Afghan ministries cannot supply. Because of this, U.S.-built
schools and health facilities often cannot be staffed or supplied. Moreover,
some facilities have fallen into disrepair; others are unsafe, incomplete,
or unsuited for their intended purposes."

The effort to control the drug trade in Afghanistan appears to have failed.
The IG report states, "Afghan farmers are growing more poppy today than ever
before, and in 2013 the value of that opium and its derivatives was
estimated at $3 billion, or the equivalent of 15 percent of Afghanistan's
GDP, representing a substantial increase from 2012."

Outside of the drug trade, almost every effort at economic development is
impeded by "the difficult security environment." For obvious reasons, no one
wants to spend a lot of money installing infrastructure in a war zone, and
it's particularly difficult and expensive to get skilled foreign laborers to
work in Afghanistan. The IG report concludes, "The Afghan government may not
be able to earn substantial revenues from Afghanistan's natural resources
any time soon because of the considerable infrastructure investment required
to develop them, especially given the difficult security environment."

The outlook for the Afghan military is cloudy as well. An earlier report
noted the disturbing number of firearms that disappeared from Afghan
military and police depots - with a strong possibility some will end up in
the hands of insurgents - and the Afghan army may not be able to rely on its
heavier armored vehicles for long, either.

The U.S. government paid $661.3 million to Textron Marine & Land Systems, a
U.S. firm, to provide 634 Mobile Strike Force Vehicles, spare parts,
maintenance, and training. Textron delivered the vehicles, the initial
shipments of spare parts, and the initial training. But as time went by, the
U.S. military and its allies could not spare the manpower to provide
security for Textron's staff for field training.

The result was not surprising: "Coalition advisors noted that the absence of
spare parts resulted in a steady deterioration of the ability to conduct
missions. SIGAR requested information on [vehicle] operational-readiness
rates, but this information is not maintained by the brigades. . . . The
continued drawdown of Coalition personnel in Afghanistan means that neither
Coalition forces nor Textron will have the resources to continue to provide
the level of logistics support services the MSF has relied on to date."



The report quotes General Joseph F. Dunford, the current commander of the
International Security Assistance Force and the U.S. forces in Afghanistan,
saying the following: "I'm not confident that if we were to leave at the end
of 2014, that those forces would be sustainable. There are some significant
capability gaps that have to be addressed in order for the Afghans to be
able to do things that we have heretofore been doing for them."

Finally Sopko used the report to reiterate a complaint he has made in the
past, that military contracts were going to local Afghans who had been, and
still may be, supporters of the insurgency.

"The Army's refusal to suspend or debar supporters of the insurgency from
receiving government contracts because the information supporting these
recommendations is classified is not only legally wrong, but contrary to
sound policy and national-security goals," Sopko writes. "It is troubling
that our government can and does use classified information to arrest,
detain, and even kill individuals linked to the insurgency in Afghanistan,
but apparently the same classified information cannot be used to deny these
same individuals their rights to contract work with the U.S. government. I
continue to urge the Secretary of Defense and Congress to change this
misguided policy and impose common sense on the Army's suspension and
debarment program."

The overall report makes for frustrating reading, offering a grim portrait
of Afghanistan as a land wracked by a violent Taliban insurgency, shifting
and unclear tribal loyalties, a largely uneducated populace, an
infrastructure continually in need of repair from damage from war, and
deep-rooted government corruption. The portrait of U.S. military forces,
diplomats, and contractors is largely, although not entirely, positive. For
the better part of the past decade, Americans sought to shift responsibility
for Afghanistan's future to the Afghans, and it's far from clear that enough
Afghans wanted it or were up to the task.

Americans may conclude that after 13 years' worth of effort and a steep
price in blood and treasure, it's time to wash their hands of the place. The
report makes clear that the process of America's departure is well underway
regardless.

"The U.S. effort to bring its men, women, and materiel home from Afghanistan
already is proceeding at a tremendous pace, as I witnessed on my trip,"
Sopko writes. "At Kandahar Airfield and Camp Leatherneck in Helmand
Province, I saw vast amounts of equipment being readied for return to the
United States. I saw trucks and Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected vehicles
being disassembled. Everything from metal poles to canvas tent covers was
being sorted into boxes to be sent home or sold as scrap. The retrograde has
been called the greatest feat of military transport in recent history."

- Jim Geraghty writes the Campaign Spot on NRO.
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