Tank wireless controversies

[Crewman]

Hi guys,

Some time ago I was intrigued by the fragment of Ken Tout's book under the title of "A Fine Night For Tanks. The Road to Falaise". As you perhaps know Ken Tout is WWII veteran and ex-tanker of the British 1st Northamptonshire Regiment. In his book he wrote among others:

Originally written by Ken Tout

Each tank crew member could hear the external messages filtered through into the i/c (intercom) system. In a leading tank Bill's wireless was picking up the series bleeps which was intended to keep a tank column on target. It was like an aircraft control system, dashes if the vehicle went too far left and dots if it veered right. A steady stream of green tracer shells from Bofors gun firing overhead also indicated the direction of the target. Added to the dots and dashes in Bill's headphones was the babble of voices, made more irritating for him because the Canadians seemed to be using a different wireless procedure from the British. Or perhaps no procedure at all. It made the head buzz while the eyes were wearied from incessant flashes in many colours. (pages 1-2 of the book)

The Poles had their own code names, which may have added to the wireless confusion mentioned by Bill and others. In place of Lombard, Valentino and Opium, the Poles were moving from Markiza (Bras) to Semafor (Saint-Aignan) and aiming for Ygrek (Saint-Sylvain) on their left flank and from Markiza to Cewka (Cramesnil), aiming for Lina (Gaumesnil).

Perhaps brief words here would clarify the armour's wireless system. (Never say "radio", command the operators in their memoirs. We never had a "radio". It was a "wireless"!). A Sherman tank had an intercom system on its wireless set, by which crew members could converse and not be heard outside the tank. They could, however, hear outside broadcasts filter through into "i.c.". To speak outside the tank the commander or operator would switch to "A" set, when all that was spoken within the tank could be heard throughout the regiment. Uncomplimentary references were often leaked in that way, to the squadron leader's profound ire. There was also a "B" set, which was a mystery to most troopers, but which fed back on a kind of restricted circuit to headquarters. (page 45)


Source:
Ken Tout
A Fine Night For Tanks. The Road to Falaise
Sutton Publishing Ltd., Stroud 1998
ISBN 0-7509-1730-X
pages 1-2 and 45 (the numbers of pages for hard cover edition)

And now something from my collection of the interviews with the WWII veterans. Writing the article and a book on various aspects of the Canadian-Polish relations and cooperation at Normandy and being intrigued by Ken Tout's text I asked for the comment ex-tanker of the Polish 1st Armoured Division, 2nd Lt. (ret.) Willie Glaser. He was a loader/signaller in the Cromwell tank codenamed "Barbara 2" that belonged to 1st Squadron of the 10th Mounted Rifles Regiment we discussed here. Willie Glaser lives in Canada today but he uses in his interview the Polish name of the Regiment so for your information "10. PSK" means 10th MRR.

Originally written by Willie Glaser for Crewman's article only

Sgt. Ken Tout's observation, does not explain a lot, his observation "There was also a "B" set, which was a mystery to most troopers…". The "B" set might have been a mystery to Sgt. Tout, but is was not a mystery to me or any other radio operator in the Polish 1st Armoured Division, as explained here: The Cromwell tanks of the 10. PSK were equipped with a wireless set number 19 Mk II or MK III. The 19 set had two components: A-set and B-set. A-set was used for speech and Morse code (Morse never used), range about 14 km. B-set was for speech only, range about 1200 m. B-set transmitted on a certain wave only, I do not remember exactly, I think it was called a ground wave and could only be used when you could see the other tank. In addition the tanks of the 10. PSK were equipped with an external telephone. I think because the 10. PSK was a reconnaissance unit. The external telephone consisted of a head phone to listen and a "Throat mike" (microphone) to speak. As the name indicates, the throat mike was fastened to the throat and picked up sound from speech vibrations in the throat.

It had two very long wires connected to a receiver in the turret. I used the external phone several times, once my tank was in a "hull down" position, meaning the tank was sitting behind a little hill, the tank commander knew from radio reports, that a couple of Tiger or Panther tanks were in front of us. I climbed the little hill to see if I can see any movements in the high hedges in front of us, sure enough, I barely recognized some panzers hidden behind the hedges. I reported my observation to the tank commander over the external phone and we drove another way to our destination. At this distance our Cromwell tank had no chance against a Tiger or Panther tank.

I do not think we had different radio procedures, our radio instructures went to radio schools in England with English instructures. I never had a problem with number 19 wireless set. A few times a tube failed, I had replacement tubes, no problem fixing.

Would you like to comment it additionally?


Best regards

C.

[Crewman]

Problem No. 2

The text below concerns Normandy Campaign period.

Originally written by Dominic Graham

The Fourth Armoured was not organized in infantry battalion/armoured regimental groups with artillery reps able to communicate to divisional headquarters, as was the fashion in the more experienced divisions by this time.

Source:
Dominick Graham
The Price of Command. A Biography of General Guy Simonds
Stoddart Publishing Co., Ltd., Toronto 1993
ISBN 0-7737-2692-6
page 153

For today's historians it is very easy to criticize and to write about the effects but nobody analyses the causes. How and where inexperienced Canadian 4th Division or Polish 1st could know anything about modern battlefield communication system and its various procedures? Do not you think that a kind of Control Section of the Canadian 1st Army ought to check in pre-Normandy period how its divisions are organized and then correct their internal organization? Do not you think that in similar cases the Canadian 1st Army HQ is never guilty but the divisions have always been guilty?


Best regards

C.

[Crewman]

Problem No. 3

The memoirs of SS-Brigadeführer Kurt Meyer, CO of the 25th SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment. The memoirs concern Normandy Campaign period.

Originally written by Kurt Meyer

Of great help to us was the lack of wireless security among the Allied forces. Not only within units was it bad but frequently orders were given over the air by senior commanders who should have known better. We were able to pick these up and immediately initiate counter-measures before the orders were implemented.


Source:
Tony Foster
Meeting of Generals
Authors Choice Press Inc., Lincoln 1986
ISBN 0-595-13750-4
page 363

And the Allied (Polish) reply:

Originally written by 2nd Lt. Willie Glaser for Crewman's article only

The buzz word here is "Allied forces". There is only a very remote possibility, the Germans listening to Polish radio transmissions understood what was talked about, everybody was using a pseudonym, mine was "Willush". Even when a map coordinate was mentioned in a transmission, the Germans did not know the governing number sequence. When I reported to the troop commander: "Barbara two" is proceeding to coordinate "F 93", the German radio operator listening to my transmission did not have clue where "F 93" is located on his map, besides most likely the number sequence changed the next day. I do not know about the British or Canadian procedures.

Besides how many Polish speaking officers did Kurt Mayer have on his staff. When Kurt Mayer speaks of "Allied forces", he meant British and Canadian. Very often in the evenings I listened to German radio traffic. There was the odd personal chatter, but I never could make sense of the combination of numbers and letters.

I was never warned specifically about Germans monitoring our transmissions. At wireless school we were told about radio security. As a radio operator I had an idea, Germans may listen to our radio transmission, like I listened to their transmission, but as outlined above, I do not think it gave the Germans any advantage, How many radio operators in the SS divisions spoke Polish?

I never heard that Germans were transmitting false orders. To whom? Certainly not on troop level, surely not on squadron level and for sure not on regimental level. One was close with crews from your troop, you knew the voice and mannerism of most radio operators. I just can not imagine this, especially in the Falaise Gap. The Germans were busy to get out of the gap. You should have seen the devastation of the German troops. They were to busy to save themselves, never mind giving false orders.

Frankly speaking I agree with Willie Glaser. There is lack of logic in Meyer's memoirs. What do you think?


Best regards

C.

[Jon Skagfeld]

Originally posted by Crewman
Hi guys,

Some time ago I was intrigued by the fragment of Ken Tout's book under the title of "A Fine Night For Tanks. The Road to Falaise". As you perhaps know Ken Tout is WWII veteran and ex-tanker of the British 1st Northamptonshire Regiment. In his book he wrote among others:



And now something from my collection of the interviews with the WWII veterans. Writing the article and a book on various aspects of the Canadian-Polish relations and cooperation at Normandy and being intrigued by Ken Tout's text I asked for the comment ex-tanker of the Polish 1st Armoured Division, 2nd Lt. (ret.) Willie Glaser. He was a loader/signaller in the Cromwell tank codenamed "Barbara 2" that belonged to 1st Squadron of the 10th Mounted Rifles Regiment we discussed here. Willie Glaser lives in Canada today but he uses in his interview the Polish name of the Regiment so for your information "10. PSK" means 10th MRR.



Would you like to comment it additionally?


Best regards

C.

Reference "B" Set of Wireless Set No 19:

Quoting from "Working Instructions RCA 113923-1"...

..."The B-set is a VHF transceiver with a frequency range of about 229-241 Mcs. When switched to receive, it acts as a super-regenerative receiver, using a "quench" or interruption frequency of between 158 Kcs and 228 Kcs; when switched to send, it acts as an anode-modulated oscillator."

[Geoff Winnington-Ball (RIP)]

Originally posted by Jon Skagfeld
....when switched to send, it acts as an anode-modulated oscillator."

So do I when I've had a few drinks.... bloody signals types!

[Tony Smith]

I recommend reading Louis Meulstee's books on WW2 Commonwealth wireless, available through this site. For info on the external phone, see here.

Originally posted by Jon Skagfeld
Reference "B" Set of Wireless Set No 19:

When switched to receive, it acts as a super-regenerative receiver, using a "quench" or interruption frequency of between 158 Kcs and 228 Kcs; ."

The problem with that being its still a transmitter on receive and unless the rest of the "fleet" have different quench frequencies then a serious case of heterodyne interference is suffered.

In the real world this interference range would be about 150yds with the B Set; on transmit the 400mW of the B Set didn't go a great deal father either according to users. Probably useful in the flat and spread out desert scenario but limited elsewhere.

R.

[Geoff Winnington-Ball (RIP)]

Wasn't one of the biggest problems with the 19 set at the time staying 'netted'? I do know from Blackburn that their range, especially in rough terrain, was somewhat less than advertised.