Reinforcement Personnel

[DITNER, S.M.]

GENTLEMEN:



A BOOK WRITTEN BY TERRY COPP THAT COVERS "BATTLE EXHAUSTION" IN THE CANADIAN ARMY IN SECOND WAR WOULD APPEAR TO SUGGEST THAT ANY SOLDIER ASSIGNED TO A REINFORCEMENT UNIT RATHER THAN STRAIGHT TO A REGIMENT HAD EITHER FAILED TO COMPLETE A TRAINING COURSE, WAS REGARDED AS SUBSTANDARD, OR WAS A DISCIPLINARY PROBLEM.

CAN ANY OF YOU COMMENT ON THIS. I AM CERTAIN YOU HAVE ALL HEARD MY STORY BEFORE (WORKING ON BIO OF RELATIVE KIA WITH 4PLDG, ITALY - 45). INDIVIDUAL WAS WITH 1 CACRU PRIOR TO BEING SHIPPED TO ALGIERS AS PART OF 1 CBRD. TOTAL TIME IN REINFORCEMENT UNITS WAS ROUGHLY A YEAR.

I AM CURIOUS IF THERE WAS A REASON FOR THIS THAT I CANNOT DETERMINE BY READING HIS RECORDS. HE EVENTUALLY MADE SERGEANT AND I CAN SEE NOTHING TO SUGGEST HE FAILED ANY COURSE.....

IS MR. COPP'S ASSERTION CORRECT?

OBLIGED.

[Geoff Winnington-Ball (RIP)]

Why are you shouting?

Throughout WW2, Canadians had the reputation as trouble-makers, or as the current vernacular would have it, as 'attitude cases'. They were regularly posted out as soon as their stuffed-up COs could blindside the receiving units. I've known a few vets who will readily acknowledge that they were 'independent spirits' who knew their jobs but needed the right environment in which to do them. This is a fine Canadian tradition. It may or may not apply in your case, but it sounds like he finally found a home where he could excel.

[DITNER, S.M.]

O.K. I will stop shouting. I merely meant to impart a sense of urgency.

Sunray, thanks for your insight. If I caught the gist of your reply, said relative was, indeed, a problem soldier.

On that note, can anyone comment on an entry that has him assigned to "Special Base Depot". It would appear that "special" meant "found wanting" based on the creation of "Special Employment Companies" for the battle exhausted.

In this case, however, the entry precedes the invasion of Sicily and individual's assignment to 4PLDG.

(Can everyone hear me?)

Ta

[peter simundson]

Hmmm...I'm not sure of that. A lot of the regular QOR during WW2 were returned to the Unit from reinforcement Units. They were SOS'd as injured to hospital, after recovery were brought on strength through reinforcement Units. They weren't holding Units for misfits or malcontents. If a soldier returning wanted to go to his original outfit that's where he ended up in most cases.
The attrition rate was such that openings were always there.

[Bill Miller]

I would not infer that being placed or held in a reinforcement unit meant your relative was a problem soldier. Your relative being held in #1 CACRU (Cdn Armd Corps Reinforcement Unit) probably only means that he was there for advanced training and possibly to take special trade courses until his particular skill or trade was required in a regiment. According to the book "The RCAC and Illustrated History"(pg118), #1CACRU was set up to reinforce trained reinforcements for armoured car and recce regiments. #2CACRU served Army Tank Regiments, and #3CACRU served reinforcements for Armoured Divisions...

Special Employment Companies were set up for men who were not fit for combat for various reasons, the excellent Terry Copps book you have on Battle Exhaustion outlines this well. Most SEC units were set up to hold neurotic cases, some mental incompetents (morons). Men unfit for frontline duty but still able to perform useful rear echelon tasks. Some SEC units, I believe #19 and #20 were set up to hold and transfer men who had physical (PULHEMS) downgrades, but again could fulfill useful Line Of Communication tasks. (I don't have my copy of "Battle Exhaustion" handy or I would quote).

Taking my own Father's record as an example, he was sent to England in the spring of 1944 after qualifying as a tank driver/mechanic. He was immediately placed in #3CACRU and was held there for three months. While there he took a fitter's course. He was then transferred to a regiment in the field. After being wounded in Germany in late Jan/45, he spent three months in the hospital and then returned to his unit. However the M.O. downgraded his hearing and was classed fit for L.O.C. duties only. (From what I read in Copp's book, had it been earlier in the war, my Father's hearing loss would have been a sure ticket back to Canada)

He was transferred into #20 S.E.C. for a couple weeks until the war's end where he was placed with the (14CAR) Calgary Tanks as a mechanic again. He finished out his post-war sevice as an ambulance driver in London. While I wouldn't say my Dad was a trouble maker, he was no angel either. However, his troubles didn't make his service record until his days in London and some "unofficial" use of the King's property... they didn't send him to an SEC then, he was indeed quite fit for a Detention centre where he was confined until they found a nice big ship back to Canada for him

Bill.

[DITNER, S.M.]

Gents:

Your advice has been most helpful. Though I know my relative to have been something of a wildman, I found no indication that he did poorly on course. Mr. Copp's sweeping reference would appear to be accurate in some cases, and not others.

The info. supplied with reference to advanced training seems to be relevant; individual was a Driver-Mechanic Class III and later drove a "Fox" in Italy. His course comments were all favourable.

PS - I have no problem with soldiers who found themselves afoul of regs. I certainly did.....

Thanks a bunch.

[klambie]

Haven't looked at Battle Exhaustion in ages, but is it possible that Copp was referring to the period early in the war, as units were first mobilizing? In that circumstance, it might be reasonable that problems were passed off to reinforcement units.

However, once units were fully mobilized and reasonably trained up (say mid 43 and later), where else were guys going to go? There would have been some wastage in full strength units, but far more guys coming over and being stuck in the reinforcement stream with no line unit in need of personnel.

I've looked at a reasonable number of personnel files for one unit, and while you will occasionally see guys that bounced around various reinf. and training units for years, you will usually see something explicit in an evaluation or the like if someone thinks he is a problem. Far more common to see guys who join or are called up a bit late, do their basic and get sent overseas to a reinf. unit (often very quickly), where they sit until combat is heavy enough to require large numbers of reinforcements.

I've also seen some information in a war diary of one of the Infantry Reinf. Units that indicate that they were a bit of an administrative gong show, at least in 1944. They did little training and had little equipment to do any training, so seem to have spent a lot of time re-organizing and re-re-organizing, moving people about with little obvious benefit. There are indications in this unit that the quality of many reinforcements is poor, but it is difficult to say if that is because they have been given lousy training (I'd tend to think this) or because of problems with the men themselves.

[John McGillivray]

Also you should note that in preparation for the invasion of Sicily in 1943(Operation Husky), the Canadian Army had asked for volunteers to transfer over to the reinforcement units bound for the Mediterranean; from front line units remaining in England. Many troops took the transfer in the hope of getting into action sooner.

The following is from “The Canadians in Italy” by G.W.L. Nicholson (p 37-38):

“The use of British channels for supplying from the Middle East all the material wants of the Canadian component of the Eighth Army once operations had begun could obviously not be extended to the "A" or personnel side to include the furnishing of reinforcements. Casualties in the Canadian force had to be replaced from Canadian sources—an arrangement presenting special problems which would not arise in the case of the non-Canadian formations engaged in "Husky". In an assault landing it was to be expected that initial casualties might be heavy. But whereas British and American reinforcements for the 15th Army Group would be available at short notice from depots already operating in North Africa, no such Canadian establishments existed nearer to Sicily than the United Kingdom.

“Accordingly a Canadian base reinforcement depot was planned, where reinforcements could be held in training close to the theatre of operations. For reasons of security it was not practicable to establish convenient reserves of Canadian troops in North Africa before the assault was launched. The Canadian planners therefore proposed that the headquarters and three of the battalions of the contemplated depot should be set up in North Africa on or after D Day, but that a fourth battalion of reinforcements, amounting to nearly 1500 all ranks, should be carried straight to Sicily in one of the early follow-up convoys, and thus be available within three days of the initial landings. Both the War Office and Allied Force Headquarters at first expressed doubts as to the practicability of this expedient, but they were finally convinced by the arguments which Canadian Military Headquarters presented. In the actual event the scheme quickly found its justification on the landing beaches, where every available man was required to assist in the unloading of ammunition, rations and stores; while in the fighting that followed reinforcements for the Canadian units were immediately forthcoming. On the other hand, had all the Canadian reinforcement battalions been sent to North Africa, it would have taken at least three weeks to replace early losses—a particularly serious situation in the event of the early casualties reaching their expected proportions. So convincingly did the "Husky" landings demonstrate the value of this policy that in planning the subsequent invasion of the Italian mainland the Eighth Army instructed each of its assault divisions to have 1000 reinforcements landed between D plus 3 and D plus 6.”

[Mark W. Tonner]

DITNER, S.M.;

Some further reading regarding Reinforcements:

- AHQ Report No. 53 (dated: 11 June 1952) entitled: CANADIAN ORGANIZATION IN THEATRES OF OPERATIONS, 1939-1945, which can be found here

and

- CMHQ Report No. 133 (dated: 29 March 1945) entitled: The Organization of the Canadian Reinforcement Units (United Kingdom): Historical Outline, 1940 - 45, which can be found here

Hope this helps.

Cheers

[DITNER, S.M.]

Gentlemen:


Insightful lot, you are. I have read some of the excerpts provided previously and gleaned info., however, I am unable to determine, based on Nicholson's book, or Dancock's or anything else I've read as yet, just what the men (in this case an armoured car driver) got up to in N. Africa?

What sort of training would 1CBRD (Phillipeville) conduct, beyond route marches, which Trooper Ditner ruefully mentions in his letters? He was not, it turns out, much impressed by the local rotgut. On the topic of training, however, he offers naught.

I recognize that many of the reinforcements were only trades trained and lacked battle school etc. and this was addressed at 1CACRU but what took place in N. Africa prior to reinforcement being shipped to Sicily (in this case August 25th, 1943)?

Thanks a bunch for your exhaustive replies. I trust I didn't slander anyone's kin with speculation as to the soldierly qualities of reinforcements. Mr. Lambie has, as always, raised a valid point; if 4th PLDG had not, as yet, lost any of its drivers, there was no call for reinforcements.

As I suggested before, I don't much care if my cousin was doing the "hatless dance" every other day, or he was a junior general. I just want to get it right....

Salud!