New D-Day vehicles for the Canadian army

[Bruce Parker (RIP)]

I work for a very large organization. Our head office routinely sends out directives, instructions and records the activities of the branch offices. In practice, 10% of it is followed, and even less of what goes on is recorded. Should someone want to study and analyze my employer's organization 60 years from now, and relied on the written record, they would get a woefully distorted picture of how things are today. There's a theory that says to understand the past, look to the forces that drive the present.

In my line of work, we rely on 'best evidence' when original evidence is not forthcoming. There's also a 'priority of evidence' rule: physical evidence is most reliable, followed by secondary evidence that reasonably dates to a time when original evidence existed and last, oddly enough, written records. The thinking is that you rely on those things humans are least likely to mistake. I haven't been fired yet so I must be doing something right.

And I don't think it's running off. It's more selecting where you choose to share your knowledge.

[servicepub (RIP)]

Originally Posted by Bruce Parker

I haven't been fired yet so I must be doing something right.

Actually, you just haven't been caught yet

[horsa]

One problem with written records and orders is they are a snapshot of what was in theory to take place at a given time. Without analysis of documents issued following that time and a study of the physical evidence including photographs, you won't know if a given set of orders were followed or the plan was revised or abandoned completely by later orders. Look at Army Council Instructions as an example of ever changing procedures to normal documented practices. And even then you can’t rely exclusively on the documents since the units may not have all received them or in some cases didn’t follow them for various other reasons.

Overall a tough forensic exercise.

[servicepub (RIP)]

David,
I don't disagree with this. Orders, and any written instructions, are there to give an overall direction in which to proceed. Good managers invariably implement these instructions taking into consideration the resources available to them, the manpower restraints, local conditions, etc... and this causes them to weave along the path - staggering from side to side but still moving in the general direction.
If everyone were to go in their own direction - which could be 180 degrees off-track, then there would be no order. The result would be chaos and armies are not generally know for that.
Clive
"No plan ever survives the Start-Line"

[Bruce MacMillan]

In researching the policy of supply and provision of wireless sets I found that the initial policy was made by beerocrats in Ottawa, mostly followed by the CAO HQ in London and modified by the field. In 1943 the policy was to equip Canadian AFVs & light recce vehicles with the Canadian WS19.

Reading an after action report from Operation Husky, the 1st Div was ordered to replace their CDN sets with British sets. It was presumed that preparations were made in such haste & secrecy that the compatibility of the two sets were not understood by those theater commanders making the decisions. Contrary to policy the "holdings on embarkation" show the CDN sets being withdrawn & replace by British units.

Documents further into 1943 & 1944 show that supply & demand and feedback from the field caused the policies to be modified. In a sense the tail wagged the dog.

I agree with Clive in that these "policies" are guidelines,subject to change,all working towards a common goal.

[Mark W. Tonner]

Gentlemen;

I didn’t really want to get involved in this discussion, but I’ve been following it since the thread started. To basically say that a unit ‘Officer Commanding’ did what they liked and basically ignored set down policy/orders/directives, is pure and simple rubbish. As Clive pointed out “If everyone were to go in their own direction - which could be 180 degrees off-track, then there would be no order. The result would be chaos and armies are not generally known for that”, this is certainly true of the Canadian Army of 1944. Even though 3rd Canadian Infantry Division was under command of the I British Corps (Second British Army) at the time of the invasion, the policy/orders/directives as set down by higher headquarters would most certainly have been implemented by the Canadian ‘Officer Commanding’ at the various levels of command within the division as these policies/orders/directives reached him and he implemented them within his command.

Moving on, the events being discussed in this thread occurred 65 years ago and as we all know, the more time passes, the more the details fade, so much so, that at some point the memories of someone who was there those 65 years ago cannot entirely be relied upon to give us the complete details of what he was issued with or of what the exact colour of it was or whether it was of Canadian or British manufacture, etc. This is why it as been asked earlier in this thread if any form of an ‘official’ paper trial had been found that stated, for example: that bright pink bow ties were to be worn by the section commanders in the infantry battalions, or that platoon commanders were to wear black top hats as a form of easy identification by the men under their command ... the point I’m trying to make is that, if a man 65 years on says that his whole unit was issued with British manufactured BD prior to the invasion, or that all of his unit’s small arms were replaced prior to the invasion, there would be a paper trail left that would document the policy/order/directive that lead to this man’s whole battalion having been issued with British manufactured BD or of his unit having had all of their small arms replaced prior to the invasion.

Such paper trails do existence and in the case of the Canadian Army of 1944, these are held at Library and Archives Canada under Records Group number 24. Although it can be a pain in the ass to sift through the documents, you are more then likely to find a copy of that policy/order/directive that directed section commanders to wear bright pink bow ties and platoon commanders to wear black top hats those 65 years ago, mind you, sometimes you’ll find the document that implemented a policy/order/directive in the most unlikely of files, but the paper trail is there at Library and Archives Canada and in the case of the Canadian Army of 1944, it can be found within Records Group number 24.

For the purposes of the subject of this thread and since the original discussion seems to be around an infantry battalion (and for those who are interested in reading the actual policy/order/directive that implemented this or that those 65 years ago, and for those willing to sift through the files), the documents pertaining to the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and the various statements and questions raised in this thread, can possibly be found within the following files at Library and Archives Canada:

Assistant Director of Ordnance Services, 3rd Canadian Division:
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 16044
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 16045

3rd Canadian Infantry Division - Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General:
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 13775, Reel T-10532
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 13776, Reel T-10533

3rd Canadian Infantry Division - General Staff:
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 13765, Reel T-7620
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 13766, Reel T-7620

Headquarters, 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade:
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 14127, Reel T-12013
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 14128, Reel T-12014

Headquarters, 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade:
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 14138, Reel T-12157
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 14139, Reel T-12158

Headquarters, 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade:
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 14151, Reel T-12330
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 14152, Reel T-12331

Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (Machine Gun):
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 15025
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 15026

Regina Rifle Regiment:
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 15197
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 15198

Royal Winnipeg Rifles:
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 15233

Canadian Scottish Regiment:
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 15035
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 15036

Queen's Own Rifles:
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 15168

Le Régiment de la Chaudière:
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 15180

North Shore (New Brunswick) Regiment:
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 15126
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 15127

Highland Light Infantry of Canada:
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 15075
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 15076

Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders:
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 15269
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 15270

North Nova Scotia Highlanders:
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 15121
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 15122


Cheers

[derk derin]

Gentlemen,
This is the first time using the computer for following and learning about the items I collect.I have been collecting Canadian Military equipment since my cadet days when I was 13 and never stopped.Up until now they were just items but now with everybody's input on where and how it was issued and used has opened my eyes as to the story of these great relics.I can see there is more than one opinion on the subject and am enjoying learning from it but would not like to see anybody get frustrated and quit discussions as it is interesting to hear different points of view.I hope Peter and others can add input on the issue and usage of equipment used by the Canadian Army.
Regards,Derk.

[Ed Storey]

Clive and Mark:

Thank you,

ED