AIF and AMF Mid-East vehicle supplies

[David_Hayward (RIP)]

We have discussed at length previously the issue of vehicles to the AIF and NZEF, plus the Indian Army in the Middle East theatre. They of course carried either a UK domestic theatre WD Census Number or a Mid-East theatre one. I can only suggest that this was to identify the vehicle types for Census purposes and spare parts ordering.

I have been through the Australian archival papers sent to me and they make interesting reading, I will endeavour to add to this thread as I can to perhaps try and resolve the mysteries surrounding thees issues, that of course ultimately led to # 11 and 12 cabs turning up in Australasia.

I have also added information from the Canadian DND papers so as to bring the Aussie papers into perspective.

[David_Hayward (RIP)]

A [British] Col. Butler went to see Colonel N.O. Carr, the DND Director of Mechanization and Artillery in Ottawa on 27 June and advised that the British Mission were definitely placing an order in Canada for 7,000 15-cwt. 4 x 2 trucks, 3,00 30 cwt. 4 x 4 trucks and 10,000 3-Ton trucks. The first two orders were to be in accordance with Departmental specifications and the latter the same specification but with standard 10.50 x 16 tyres instead of Run-Flat type. Butler stated that the Mission would like to have priority on production over the then current orders for the Canadian 3rd Division and ancillary troops! Carr said that he had no power to give such a decision, but in his opinion as both countries were fighting an Empire war the British order should be merged with the Canadian’s and divided between G.M. and Ford to take full advantage of industrial capacity, and that a decision should be made as soon as possible as to who was to receive priority of delivery....

...Carr had also been informed by G.M. of Canada that they had received an inquiry from Australia for 1,900 4 x 4 “National Defence specification” [ie Canadian Military Pattern”] and was asked what reply GM should give. He claimed he was at a loss to give any constructive advice. This approach plus the British order emphasised the need to get into maximum production as soon as possible and maintain peak production until the tap was turned off....

....On 30 July, John Eaton, Director of Purchases in Ottawa on behalf of the British Government wrote to Colonel Dewar, Director of Clothing, Equipment & Manufacturing Establishments, Department of National Defence, setting out the procedures to be adopted in shipping to British orders. The manufacturers were to notify the D. of P. by telegram of the car numbers and details of shipments as they left the factory. This information was then to be relayed to Ordnance Transit Officers [“O.T.O.”] in St. John, N.B., Halifax, N.S., and Montreal, P.Q.. The O.T.O. was to then collaborate with the Transit Controllers Office [“T.O.”] in the Department of Transport, Ottawa, in the allocation of carloads in relation to cargo space available on ships, and were to then prepare Bills of Lading. One copy of the packing slip was given to the ship’s purser to be handed over to the representatives of the Ministry of Supply at the port of disembarkation. When the report of sailing was received, the D. of P. was to cable the M. of S. and two copies of the packing notes would follow by mail ...

.... Colonel NO Carr wrote to Mr Sargent, the Chairman of newly founded The Steel Body Manufacturers’ Association in Toronto on 12 July 1940, concerning pilot models of bodies for the 15- and 30-cwt. British order trucks. The Inspection Committee confirmed 29 July that the bodies would be forwarded to Toronto as soon as possible for inspection before the various body builders arranged production. All the manufacturers had been asked to submit suggested specifications covering the types of body that they manufactured for the benefit of the DMA....

...The manufacturers were responsible for the internal freighting to ports in Canada, and then the M of S were responsible for shipping charges on a “collect” basis on delivery. GM. Products of Canada arranged shipment through the Oshawa Railway Company, which was part of the Canadian National Railway. Ford at Windsor probably also used the CNR which ran right into their Plant. The freight cars were then railed to Montreal in the St. Lawrence Seaway season, and/or St John, and Halifax. Shipping space had to be booked by the Transport Controller: for example Cunard White Star Limited, but the Canadian Government Merchant Marine would handle locally. Each truck [or car] shipped conformed to weight and size calculations because they had to be packed into holds with varying capacity. It was also required that trucks be railed to the coastal ports as well as Montreal in order to take advantage of shipping space as it became available. .... British orders were all boxed by the manufacturers, and completely assembled except for superstructure, canvas covers, and the upper half of the cab so that on arrival the trucks could be removed from the crates and driven from the dockside: in this respect they differed from Canadian orders which required assembly including installation of engines. Each crate was duly marked, and trucks were declared for customs purposes when shipped as follows:

FORD
15 cwt $942.70
30 cwt. $1,445.40
3-Ton 4 x 2 $1,484.27

CHEVROLET
15 cwt $942.70
30 cwt. $1,445.40
3-Ton 4 x 2 $1,451.42

The initial 20,000 units for the Ministry of Supply were intended to be supplied as follows:

FORD:
3,500 15-cwt. 4 x 2
1,500 30-cwt. 4 x 4
6,000 3-Ton 4 x 2

CHEVROLET:
3,500 15-cwt. 4 x 2
1,500 30-cwt. 4 x 4
4,000 3-Ton 4 x 2

in lots of 100 units, plus spare parts. However, the last lot was to consist of 50 Ford 3-Ton and 10 Chevrolet 3-Ton trucks. The extra 1,000 units may have consisted of spare parts representing 1,000 complete trucks...

...The 3-Tonners were probably MCP “Modified Conventional Pattern” trucks, whereas the others were CMP units. However, in September approval was given to the shipment of the 6,000 Ford 158-in wheelbase 3-Ton trucks in open crates...

....To illustrate the urgency of the demand for Canadian trucks, reference is made to the Ministry of Supply Demands [contracts]: Supply/Mechanical [“SM” or “S/M”] 2002 to 2006 which were placed in June 1940 in Ottawa:

S/M 2002 was intended to cover 3,500 15 cwt. Fords for Bombay, and the same number of Chevrolets for England [this consisted of Ford 15 cwt C101WF and Chevrolet C15 GS body CMP trucks];

S/M 2003 1,500 30 cwt. Fords for Bombay and 1,500 Chevrolets for England [Ford F30S and Chevrolet C30S 30 cwt GS CMP trucks];

S/M 2004 was for 3-Tonners, 5,742 Ford trucks, 66 Ford Stores, 86 Wreckers and 86 Machinery for England [Ford C098T 3-Ton MCP];

S/M 2005 [Bombay] and 2006 [England] covered 4,787 Chevrolet trucks split 3,829 for Bombay and 958 for England, with 57 Stores, Wreckers and Machinery for Bombay and 14 of each for England [Chevrolet Model 1543X2 MCP].

Bodies and chassis were to be boxed separately and marked accordingly after the case number: one body and one chassis were meant to be shipped together to form one unit.

By 28 August, this had all changed:

S/M 2002 required 3,000 Ford 15 cwt for Egypt, 500 for Mombasa, and 3,500 Chevrolets for England;

S/M 2003 became 1,200 30 cwt. Fords for Egypt and 300 for Mombasa, with 1,500 Chevrolets for England;

S/M 2004 was for 5,742 3-Ton Ford trucks plus 86 of each of Stores, Wreckers and Machinery;

S/M 2005 became 4,787 Chevrolet 3-Ton trucks split 3,150 for Egypt, 670 for Mombasa and 967 for England, with 71 Stores, Wreckers and Machinery split 50 for Egypt, 10 for Mombasa and 11 for England in each case.

[The War Department Census shows that under S/M 2006 Census Numbers were issued for 4 x 2 GS trucks, totalling 193 units. These we know were assembled by GM Ltd in Bamber Bridge, Preston, and the remainder must therefore have been diverted and shipped to Egypt. I discount assembly here and then shipment to Egypt].

The domestic theatre Census shows that S/M 2002 totalled 3,211 Chevrolet units registered and 1,500 Chevrolets under S/M 2003...


...Problems then arose as output in Oshawa and Windsor fell short of expectations, and this then had a knock-on effect as shipping space had been booked and had to be released. However, the British orders varied slightly from the Canadian specifications. Carr had to reprove Col. Butler of the British Mission because a request had been made for tyre chains etc. to be shipped without rust protection which demonstrated lack of ignorance of Canadian practice. Experience had shown that metal corroded rapidly without the application of the Degas coating which was applied on C.A.S.F. vehicles. There were slight differences between what were supposed to be identical vehicles, e.g. gas tank filler necks, but it would be advantageous to share information for mutual benefit: could any changes in specification please be routed through his office in future?....

....Lt. Colonel J.H. Smith, Technical Liaison Officer at the United Kingdom Technical Mission, 58 Lyon Street, Ottawa, wrote to the Chief Ordnance Mechanical Engineer [COME], Colonel N.C. Sherman, on 5 November 1940 and placed on record his sincere appreciation of the co-operation by his department in enabling the equipment being provided to supply equipment by various contractors to Ford and GM. Sherman then advised generally that the work referred to coincided with details of work for the Army Field Workshops for the DND, and the amount of money involved in the British orders was C$1,120,000; the saving effected over previous contract prices was $234,000, which would be further augmented by a saving of another $140,000 on contracts then being placed for the DND by the Department of Munitions and Supply

Obviously the reference to the Egypt deliveries, ie to Alexandria, will be relvant in due course as the Australian papers refer to quantities on order.

[cliff]

It is interesting to note that the Ford 3 ton truck cost $32.85 more to ship then the GM one.

David this is excellent information and I thank you for sharing it.

Cheers
Cliff

[David_Hayward (RIP)]

The procedures as regards financial adjustments between the UK and Commonwealth of Australia Governments daye back to a Memo dated 18th March 1940 by the Secretary to the Department of Defence Co-ordination. Basically it set out what was to happen about expenses, etc. but the relevant part is that payments made in respect of assesses values of equipment and supplies drawn by the 2nd AIF on British Ordnance and Supply Depots for the issue of equipment and supplies. The arrangements, paraphrased, were that on arrival in Jerusalem instructions from the War Office were submitted by the Command Paymaster, British Forces in Palestine, directing that claims for all supplies of materials etc issued by the British to the Australian Contingent was to be passed to the War Office for settlement between the two Governments.

A 24th December 1941 Memo states that the procedures for supplies for the AIF Abroad or Forces of other parts of the E,pire was that settlement would be effected in sterling in London by the UK Ministry of Supply and the supplying country, Australia, would be responsible for sendign the necessary advices to its representative in London to enable settlement to be made. This is as per memo for settlement of accounts in respect of transactions authorised by the Eastern Groupe Supply Council forwarded to the High Commissioner's office from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs on 15th October 1941. Basically the M of S dealt with all supply orders, then the Ministry recovered the costs from the consignee. Provision of requirements for all land forces in the Mid-East, East Africa and Malaya were co-ordinated by the War Office through local commanders. The War Office was to adjust seperately with members for the provision made for members' forces in the Mid-East, East Africa and Malaya. As from 1st december 1940 in the case of the Mid-East, costs of all supplies shipped from Australia were to be recovered from the UK Government. All issues of supplies to the AIF were therefrom be from stocks on charge to the UK Government and included in the per capita rate payable by Australia for the maintenance of its troops abroad.

Explanation: the British took over all supply orders, and then sorted out the costs later through the High Commission in London who then sent the bills back to Canberra. The Brtrish would supply and maintain the forces, and the Australian Government reimburse the British for its forces' maintenance.

This seems to explain what happened as regards vehicle supplies: see next instalment. However, note that the British had agreed that everyone would comply with the agreement that the British Ministry of Supply would do all the ordering, etc. and the War Office would arrange supply in the three theatres mentioned. Any Australian supplies used were to be paid for by the British who then sent the bill back again!

[David_Hayward (RIP)]

The customs value meant the value of each vehicle...the Ford 3-tonner cost more than the Chevrolet! C.M.P. trucks were assembled in batches of 25 for around C$50 per piece.

[Keith Webb]

David

Thanks for your fantastic research - I find it extremely interesting to get that sort of grass roots info. Wonderful.

Does anyone have a 1940s to 2006 dollar calculator?

$50 to assemble a CMP sounds cheap, doesn't it?

[Keith Webb]

Here are the approx values according to a calaulator I found (which goes to 2005 values).

FORD
15 cwt $942.70 = $13,122.55
30 cwt. $1,445.40 = $20,120.22
3-Ton 4 x 2 $1,484.27 = $20,661.29

Assembly $50 per unit = $696.00

The calculator in case anyone is interested can be found here.

[cliff]

Originally posted by David_Hayward
The customs value meant the value of each vehicle...the Ford 3-tonner cost more than the Chevrolet! C.M.P. trucks were assembled in batches of 25 for around C$50 per piece.

Sorry I misread this part and thought it was the shipping cost per unit and not a value for customs.

Cheers
Cliff

[David_Hayward (RIP)]

I have picked the trucks nearest (first two) the CMP equivalents but in the casre of the C098TFS FC60L, we have the civilian version to compare:

15 cwt [3/4 tonner] say 01D $840
30 cwt say 018T $990
3-Ton say C098T $1,447!

I should add that DND papers show that the selling price per unit was basically cost + 5% I think from memory.

[Keith Webb]

Originally posted by David_Hayward
DND papers show that the selling price per unit was basically cost + 5% I think from memory.

Interesting to see how low the margins were, but this was war after all.

[Phil Waterman]

Originally posted by Keith Webb
Here are the approx values according to a calaulator I found (which goes to 2005 values).

FORD
15 cwt $942.70 = $13,122.55
30 cwt. $1,445.40 = $20,120.22
3-Ton 4 x 2 $1,484.27 = $20,661.29

Assembly $50 per unit = $696.00

The calculator in case anyone is interested can be found here.

You mean to say that if they manufactured a CMP today it would cost under $25,ooo. What was that about the cost of military vehicles of today and will they really do much more, or do it much better, or be cheeper to maintain, or easier to understand and repair?

[Keith Webb]

I suppose that was supplied with the standard GS type body - David, do you have the prices for any of the specialist vehicles such as gun tractors or say a F60H wrecker?

[David_Hayward (RIP)]

The Exchange Requirements Committee had been set up in September 1939 to regulate the outflow of British currency reserves.

Let's then pick up the story!

...The Ministry of Supply was beholden to the ERC for approval of any foreign acquisitions including for forces overseas and that included both Canadian and US. [‘North American’] purchases. The attitude expressed by the Minister of Supply can only have inflamed Ottawa when a short time later it appeared that the British government had interfered and reneged on a large contract for vehicles in favour of Ford of Britain . In January 1940 the Canadian Minister of Finance complained bitterly through the High Commissioner in London to the Secretary of State for the Dominions, Anthony Eden, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer that a Ford of Canada order for 2,300 trucks to be supplied through Ford in Bombay had been curtailed [although in fact halved], because of lack of Canadian dollar exchange. To make matters worse Ford at Dagenham had been contracted to provide the vehicles, thus resulting in aggravation of the India-Canada imbalance of trade, and an adverse effect on Ford of Canada. One Civil Servant succinctly announced ‘I am afraid that it is the diversion of the balance of the orders to the Ford Company in England which is the real source of irritation in this case’ . The response also summed up the situation perfectly:

This is an awkward business. There is already a long history, since the outbreak of war, of sensitiveness on Canada’s part and of friction with her in regard to reductions in Canadian exports to this country which have been necessitated by war conditions; and she has argued that her war effort must be adversely affected by interference with her internal economy.

After much discussion at high level the Duke of Devonshire and the Chancellor wrote to explain that the vehicles were for the mechanisation of the army in India, part of a pre-war process, and the British ‘taxpayers’ were footing the bill [NOTE THIS SLOTS IN WITH THE REFERENCES IN PAGE 2]. Although a proportion of the requirement had been placed with Canada, the rest was intended to obviate the need for redundancies in Dagenham. It was acknowledged though that the matter could have been dealt with more sensitively; this was regrettably indicative of the concerns over dollar exchange that resulted in the blinkered belief in domestic production being able to satisfy requirements, lack of appreciation of continuing Canadian economic assistance to the UK and the need to keep the Canadian industries rolling with consecutive orders in addition to Canada’s own.

Large numbers of Canadian Fords were indeed procured by the British for delivery to Bombay but this was then rescinded possibly because the Indian Army had brought to Egypt a quantity of Chevrolets [1940 Models at least] which then became the responsibility of the WD. That in turn meant the ERC had to agree to a Ministry of Supply request for dollars to purchase spare parts for them from GM Near East and also RAOC, RASC and other units that were using Chevrolet trucks as well. Payment in Egyptian Pounds in Egypt required immediate purchase of [US] dollars by Near East and therefore technically this required dollar exchange consent. The reason for this is that all transactions between GM subsidiaries had to be made in dollars through New York, and that required dollar purchases. [FORD DID THE SAME, POSSIBLY THROUGH DEARBORN ALTHOUGH THEY MAY HAVE HAD A NYC OFFICE]. Apart from the £10,000 for the spares for the latter’s vehicles, a running contract of expenditure up to £14,000 per year was agreed to with ‘GM Limited’ {sic.) as required by the Army in Egypt. The sum was agreed by the ERC. because there was no hope of supplying small quantities of spare parts for these vehicles with ‘any degree of efficiency’.

However by August 1940 and with the entry of the Italians into the war, the Mediterranean was closed to US. shipping; GM Near East could no longer obtain supplies and GM. required purchases for the Army to be made through the British Purchasing Commission in New York. Impressments increased the number of Chevrolets being used, and $137,000-worth of spare parts covering 5 months’ requirements was purchased from local agents. Further purchases of spares were required and $130,000 was requested to be authorised to purchase 8 months’ worth of stock, at say $16,000 per month, or $200,000 per year. ERC consent was then requested for the immediate purchase of spares to $130,000 and for purchases to cover monthly demands for spare parts.

I hope that gives you some idea how much more money these trucks cost to run once they arrived.

[David_Hayward (RIP)]

I am not sure that any figures have been quoted for GTs but on top of the chassis-cab price had to be added the body price. The F60H bodies were supplied in Canada and also, as were a myriad of other bodies, from UK companies. I now have a complete list of all Canadian contracts for bodies by type and UK supplier but no figures are quoted for costings, just numbers ordered. So, the body cost had to be added in the UK and paid for through the High Commission to the Ministry of Supply. The M of S ordered the bodies as agents, and also bar three plants that operated under direct CMHQ contract, organised the assembly of vehicles by companies all round the country which the High Commission had to pay for as well. We needed those dollars!

[David_Hayward (RIP)]

A DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Minute Paper, undated but we can guess dates to February 1941, stated that as a result of contact with the branch of the Diretcor of Mechanization, information set out concerning the equipping of the AIF and AMF had been supplid.

AIF:

Units in addition to those on order for the purpose were required to complete:

a) initial equipment
b) war wastage
c) reserve pool for 6, 7, 8, 8 Div and Corps Troops

These were set under "War Office Types" and were broken down into two makes of vehicles, ie Chevrolet and Ford.

TABLE HERE

The % of Chevrolet to Ford was based on the complete equipment for a 4 Division Corps. All of the above they said would be obtained throught he War Office and shipped direct from Canada to Egypt and they would require to be complete with all equipment "as our equipment throughout would not be suitable as it is built to Australian standards".

It then mentions that if it was determined to supply any more WO types and that these should be supplied through Australia, it was necessary to place the orders forthwith to catch shipments ex-Factory starting in October [1941] subject to priority of the Canadian Government. These units if shipped in October should be complete for delivery to the Army in Australia in mid-December [!]. It was recommended that if supplies of WO type units were to go forward through Australia that two Uniys complete in detail of all available War Department models made in Canada be shipped to Australia so that bodies and equipment may be developed and built in time to meet incoming chassis*.

In addition to the 4.329 WD Units [CMPs] there were a further 4.200 units on order for the AIF and it was estimated that it would be through October that these would be in the hands of the respective Units.

Also: Tractors were required for the AIF less 9th Division- 130 4 x 4; 23 6 x 6 and 14 4 x 4 semi-trailers, plus 79 4 x 4 and 5 4 x 4 semi-trailers for the 8th Divisiojn. It was recommended that orders be placed immediately for the balance of this equipment; availability being 100 per week for 1st June 1941 shipment.

The conclusion mentions that "providing the War Office release the 4,329 vehicles as listed earlier the AIF equipment of 'B' class lorries will be completed".

I believe, ladies and gentlemen, that this confirms that issues to the AIF and AMF were by requirements and the War Office in London were requested to release these from Britih supply, and hence money changed hands via London for these. I suggest that the same applied to the NZEF, but the Indian Army would have been catered for by the WO internally so to speak.


* My notes say that there was a "CD AGAINST S/M 2019 FOR A SINGLE CHEVROLET 3 TON TRUCK, AND ONE FORD COMPLETE TRUCK, 1 CAB/CHASSIS, AND 895 TRUCKS WITHOUT BODIES. IT ALSO INCLUDED A SINGLE BODY FROM THE CANADIAN TOP AND BODY COMPANY, FOR AUSTRALIA" :see next panel!

[David_Hayward (RIP)]

AMF

The suggested impressment scheme was reported to have an availability of new and used units which would permit of approximately a 25% coverage together with approximately 50% of their total tractor requirements. There were 3,600 units in the AMF arriving through April.

GM:
CHEVROLET 1941 MODELS: no further orders could be placed with the factory.
15-cwt WAR OFFICE TYPE: 1,300 units were available against immeidate order for August [1941] shipment.
The only one I know of that might relate to this is SM 2196 "15 CWT. 4 X 4 101 IN. AUSTRALIAN DELIVERED", although these were evidently 1942 deliveries. These may have then become 1943 W.O.73 models when assembled in 1943 by Holden's or could be an earlier order.
WAR OFFICE TYPE OTHER MODELS: Orders were required to be placed immediately to secure October shipments subject to priority of the Canadian Government. This would give delivery date to the Army of approximately the middle of December.

FORD:
The following were available but had to be ordered immediately:
1941 CONVENTIONAL TYPES:
a) 1,700 available with shipment in July, with delivery commencing July and September at best.
b) 1,500 available with shipment in August, with delivery commencing August and October at best.
WAR OFFICE TYPE: 6,600 available in 8 cwt and 15 cwt models only; delivery as above.
MARMON-HERRINGTON: Available at the rate of 100 per week; shipment commencing 1st week in June.

Provided the 4,329 were released, the AMF would be 33% equipped. No stock was available from either GM or Ford in Conventional Types earlier than late September, seven months hence they said,

without General Motors are successful in their American Plant. They are endevaouring to do this and are investigating the possibility of having available either:

a) 6,000 or any part of it, 4 x 4 Chevrolet as supplied to the US Army
b) 6,000 or any part of it, Standard Chevrolet American models packed to Australian material specifications and complete with the heavy 4,500 lb front axle.
The "4 x 4" reference suggests that these were "Yankie Joe" Model YPs, as being orderded also by the Netherlands East Indies Purchasing Commission in NYC. Note also the conventional Chevroelts offered by Holden's with a heavy bumper: this might explain the photos that we have discussed on MLU before.

Further advice by cable is awaited. It will be noted that the 15-cwt War Office model is available from both GM and Ford and that Ford have also the 8-cwt unit with August as the shipping month for both companies". Was this because Ford were producing F.8s to S/M 2030 at the time? Or was it because they were plugging the new F.8A that had been prototyped with # 12 Cab by then?

[David_Hayward (RIP)]

My final page is about a Memorandum dated 27th March 1941 by the Secretary to the Department of the Army. This needs to be made sense of and paraphrased:

8th December 1940: Major-General Milford wrote notes on the vehicle situation in the Middle East and brought them back to Canberra:

The British have ordered 10,000 of the New Canadian Army models, and we want to change to these models also as soon as we possibly can. Government pressure should be brought to bear to obtain them sooner than June 1941, the date adbvised from Melbourne when they will be coming to hand

3rd January 1941: Lt Vol. RM Dollery to Brigadier EJ Milford:

Director of Mechanization will be interested to know that large consignments of the new Canadian Army type vehicles are arriving in M.E. but not for us. They consist mostly of the 30-cwt and 3-ton types, and orders for the Canadian Army types should be pressed to the limit as regards priority of delivery, and I suggest time should be saved by direct shipment to the Middle East.

This means: a) S/M 2002 for Ford 15 cwt Alpha packs had arrived in Alexandria by December 1940 although some we know arrived in January.. now the majority arrived in January from this; plus b) S/M 2003 for Ford F30 and Chevrolet C30 CMPs arrived in Decembewr and then January, which we know were issued to the AIF subsequently; and c) S/M 2005 which was for 3,150 CC60L 3-tonners also arrived in December and then January.

Notes for CGS with relation to MT of the AIF prepared during visit of CGS and Minister to the M.E. and brought back from the M.E. by the CGS:

Early provision of the new Canadian Army type vehicles is vital. They are to War Office Specifications and are ideal for M.E. conditions. Large numbers are alreasy arriving in the M.E. to UK orders. Advice from Australia is to the effect that we cannot expect deliveries for the AIF till June 1941. The strongest representations should be made prior to that date. UK, Canadian, and Indian Governments have ordered them in large numbers, and the problem is to obtain a proportion of the output of the Ford and General Motors factories in Canada for the AIF at the earliest possible date. In this connection the time saved by ordering complete with bodies for shipment direct from Canada might receive consideration.

The Minister for the Army and CGS visited the Middle East and personal representations were made to the Minister regarding the desirability of providing the AIF with Canadian War Department type mechanical vehicles and the CGS brought back to Canberra reports on the performance of AIF vehicles. General Blamey had reported on the MT performance in the M.E. Was he the CGS?

[David_Hayward (RIP)]

Demand S/M 2019 was the first, I believe, serious order for CMPs for the Mid-East, together with contemporary but numerically higher S/M Demands for GTs etc.

My notes say:

LORRY 3 TON 4 X 4 GS MUST BE MIXED ORDER BETWEEN CHEVROLET 8443 AND FORD C018Q S/M 2019 CONTRACT 294/V/4288 F.60L
L 773980-7741532

The Chevrolets might include L 1304787 and L 1305132 issued to NZEF and AIF in Mid-East respectively and L 4624486 to the AIF

As regards Fords, these may have been for the UK only initially and were assembled here under 294/V/4288. We know that the Fords were built by April 1941 and included
2G-14877-F
/14658-F
/14881-F
/14685-F
/14909-F
/15125-F
/14474-F
/14564-F
/15056-F
/14463-F
/15165-F
/14682-F
/15058-F
/14855-F
/15149-F
/14349-F


because they were w/o in the train crash en route to the port!

Then: "S/M 2104 WAS SUBMITTED 2 JULY 1941 TO CANADA AND COMPRISED 10,000 3-TON LORRIES “SIMILAR TO SM 2019 FORD AND CHEVROLET” WITH 10.50 X 20 GENERAL PURPOSE TYRES PACKS CKD, NOTE CKD, FOR ASSEMBLY IN INDIA AND SOUTH AFRICA. THE DESTINATIONS MUST HAVE CHANGED BY AUTUMN 1942 - 150 UNITS DESTINED FOR SINGAPORE; 145 FOR AUSTRALIA; CUMULATIVE PRODUCTION AT 30 JUNE 1942: 9,641
[FOR EGYPT] and 9,695 BY OCTOBER 1942

This I believe was a 60% Chev/40% Ford for 10,000 3-tonners, but Australia ordered 9,828 for the A.M.F. Australian Order No. 828, sent to the War Office.

So you can see the Australian requests bore fruit and 2104 was lodged 2nd July 1941, probably fortuitously as it then took well into the following year to get production and deliveries under way and by then Pearl Harbor had been and gone and priorities changed.


However I can now confirm that the very first Australian orders for CMPs were included in orders placed in Canada for Australia on 2nd August 1941:
FORD 112" Passenger cars...12
3-TON 4 X 4 134" W.B........2025
3-TON 4 x 4 158" W.B........1731
FORD 11T MCP.................306 including 300 already ordered direct by Australia though it must have been for US 6-cylinders.

However, the only one I know of must have been S/M 2106 which were all shipped direct to overseas, and 400 went to Basra, though a quanity went to Australia. I have no information yet on 2105 and 2107 but until proven otherwise I conject that these related to these first orders. Perhaps there is a record card for these? The next known Australian orders were S/M 2126 and 2127 which included F60S and C60S, produced around September 1942.

[David_Hayward (RIP)]

These are my observations:

1. Note that the Australian Government had advised the Canadian Department of National Defence back in June 1940 that they wished to acquire 1,900 CMPs or rather DND-patterns they were then or War Office types, or Canadian War Office types. Carr seems to have shrugged at this...he had the demand from the British for thousands on his desk and the Brits wanted priority over the Canadian orders, and yet the factories were struggling to cope with the latter!

2. The hypocrisy of elements of the British Ministry of Supply, War Office and Exchange Requirements Committee have to be understood. It was generally and genuinely felt that we had no dollars to pay for North American supplies, that the Canadian forces would be supplied by the British from British production for which the Canadians would pay in dollars or sterling, and that if it came to the crunch the Americans would step in. However that latter point overlooked the fact that dollars and gold had to be expended directly under "Cash and Carry" then applicable.

3. This then changed with the French capitulation, which meant:
a) Diverted French orders for thousands of vehicles could be snapped up for nothing and
b) Resources had to be switched to the Middle East and North and East Africa and
c) The invasion scare required Australian, Canadian and New Zealand troops to be equipped to defend the homeland.

When the invasion was off, the AIF and NZEF could be sent to North Africa, and military transport was sent out to the Mid-East where it was required [as well as subsequently Kenya, Singapore, and then Ceylon and India].

4. By the end of June 1940 and the fall of France it was clear that MT was required for the Mid-East etc on top of the French orders; that British supply was never going to be enough and was going to be be hampered by air raids, and plans had to be considered for the invasion of Europe, possibly in 1942. This was the 'Z + 27' Plan. The Army Z + 27 programme called for a total of 256,748 motor vehicles to be delivered between 1 August 1940 and 30 November 1941, excluding those delivered by 1 August 1940.

5. By the time that the the AIF and NZEF had been shipped from the UK to join the forces already there, they needed transport. The British had ordered vehicles for direct delivery and also arranged to send out vehicles assembled in the UK. It must have been very galling for the AIF top brass to see British-ordered vehicles arriving that were ideal for their requirements and they could not get hold of any. The same no doubt applied to the NZEF, although not the Indian Army.

6. Summarising the financial arrangements, the British Government took over responsibility for ordering and supply for the East. Any Australian supplies were to be paid for by the Ministry of Supply then charged back to the Australian Government through the High Commission in London. At some stage the War Office in London must have acceded to Australian requests, released thousands of vehicles from WO stocks in north Africa, and then arranged for financial settlement in due course. As to when this all kicked in, I would suggest June 1941 at the earliest. However I am sure that local commanders had already arraneged issues/loans of MT to the Dominion forces, and the paperwork may have caught up later.

7. The Australian Government arranged for thousands of Canadian vehicles to be supplied direct, but these were all it seems initially orderdf through London. However requests for details of US Army orders for 4 x 4 Chevrolets from GM were directed to be made through the Australian Government's representative in Washington. Understandable in view of the involvement of the Pentagon in overseas military sales, as this directly impinged on GM production for the Army. It would appear that these US military Chevrolets were outside the Canadian ordering system and thus the British system. I can add here that GM had two offices dealing with war supplies, one in NYC and the other in Washington, and Ronald K Evans, an experienced GM Overseas man was based in Washington and dealt with the NEI orders, as well as the Yugoslav, Afghan, and any other countries' orders that I do not know of, plus possibly sales of trucks for use as ambulances in the UK, or for food and relief work paid for by American citizens. These were often military-spec or similar to but are more lijkely to have been dealt with through the NYC office which handled export sales.

8. As we all now, at the end of the day when the AIF, IA and NZEF were shipped out from the Mid-East, the vehicles went with them. Amongst them were evidently survivors of the first British orders for # 11 Cabs, that arrived perhaps in December 1940.

That concludes this Essay.


PLEASE SEE THIS THREAD: http://www.mapleleafup.org/forums/sh...3649#post63649

[Shane Lovell]

David

Just to let you know that I sent you a package of documents earlier this week. Hopefully, you receive them next week. One is a summary of correspondence during 1941.

cheers

Shane

[David_Hayward (RIP)]

Thanks to Mr Shane Lovell's incredible research, I have been sent (arrived today) papers from the Australian liaison officers in London that explain so much. One thing that I must ask is whether Australia received {for the AMF} US Fords, namely at least 11T, which would be "Jailbars" I think, as well as US-sourced Chevrolets which I believe was the case...the latter we proved from photop evidence. If this was indeed the case then these orders were Australia-New York direct orders and direct deliveries in return.

[David_Hayward (RIP)]

In order to make sense of 1942 papers, can anyone tell me what

6 AOD
4 BOD
9 VRD
MEX .Carriers were sent by rail to MEX..so Middle East eXchange?
W.E. in relation to stocks of vehicles.

mean in relation to vehicles for the 9th Australian Division?
The "8 Armd Bde" is obvious, and mentioned.

I should mention that it appears as though the "11T" Fords may have been delivered as 6-cylinder versions, but 1942 Models. They may have actually ordered 6-cylinder 1GT 1941 Models and received 2GT Jailbars. Anyone got any photo evidence please from North Africa, around El Alamein say? Note that there is no evidence that Ford of Canada produced any 4- or 6-cylinder 1941-2 Trucks so these must have been US-sourced.

[Tony Smith]

6AOD = 6th Advanced Ordnance Depot
4BOD = 4th Base Ordnance Depot
9VRD = 9th Vehicle Reserve Depot
MEX = ????????
W.E. = War Establishment, the quantity of various equipment issued to a unit serving in a theatre of combat. Also applies to troop numbers/roles.

[David_Hayward (RIP)]

Thanks...now I remember about WE, although the term War Establishment was used in full I seem to remember in WD papers.